CONCLUSION

April 30, 1985 will mark the tenth anniversary of the fall of South Vietnam. Still, after ten years, the haunting memory of millions of panic-stricken South Vietnamese fleeing by sea and air to escape the on-rushing North Vietnamese Army remains deeply etched in the minds of those who were there to witness those tragic events in 1975. Even more disheartening, the refusal of the United States to take decisive action to fulfill its obligations to a former ally may have serious implications for our future relationships with other democratic third world nations, and their perception of the U.S. as a reliable ally. Although numerous lessons can be drawn from Vietnam experiences, three will have significant impact upon future U.S. actions in foreign affairs.

The first lesson is the need to distinguish between problems which lend themselves to political solutions and those which require military ones. Indeed, the Paris Agreements failed miserably because they did not solve this very problem. The Joint Military Commission was one created to solve a political problem--that of determining which side controlled which territory. Because this issue of controlling territory was not decided through political means, the cease-fire could not last. Conversely, the U.S. and South Vietnam's reluctance to put effective military pressure on North Vietnam by conducting the ground war above the 17th parallel and denying Hanoi a secure rear area was a major mistake not to apply a military solution where one was needed. Instead, the U.S. only employed air warfare to a point where the North Vietnamese would agree to negotiate if the bombings were halted, allowing them time to regroup and prepare for their next offensive. By allowing the enemy to maintain the initiative, RVNAF morale suffered drastically because the soldiers eventually felt the situation was hopeless and appeared to them that the enemy would never give up. The policy to negotiate politically what had not been won on the battlefield proved disastrous throughout the Vietnam War, and is a key point our future leaders should keep in mind during negotiations in future armed conflicts.

A second lesson to be learned from Vietnam is that the U.S. must have domestic support for its foreign policy to succeed. More importantly, our leaders must be articulate enough to express that policy clearly, and convince the American people that our nation pursue that policy in order to protect our national interests. Again, U.S. policy-makers failed to analyze the U.S. public's willingness to support the Vietnam War and were unable to rally domestic support for our foreign policy in Vietnam, especially in the period following the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1973. Prior to engaging in future third world conflicts, our national leaders must cautiously avoid commitment until certain that the national will is strong enough to sustain U.S. policy over an extended period of time--possibly under adverse conditions.

Although I did not devote much time in this paper speaking about the role of the news media during this period, it's very apparent the North Vietnamese were much more effective than the U.S. in using the press to justify their policies and aims. Our leaders need to be more adept in explaining our foreign policy to the American public and more aggressive at correcting erroneous press reports. The outrageous reports of indiscriminate U.S. bombings of North Vietnam in December 1972 by the Western news media were extremely successful in substantially hardening public and Congressional opinions against continued American involvement in the war and forcing the Nixon Administration to stop the bombing. In halting the bombing when it did, the U.S. failed to destroy North Vietnam's war sustaining capabilities just at the most opportune moment when Hanoi's air defenses were almost completely annihilated and U.S. aircraft could have virtually roamed free over the skies of North Vietnam.1 As a result, the North Vietnamese got the cease-fire they needed, succeeded in forcing the U.S. out of Vietnam, and gained precious time to rebuild their combat power for their final assault on South Vietnam.

The truth about the Christmas bombings revealed that only military areas were targeted and hit (aside from some civilian structures such as the Bach Mai Hospital which suffered damage because it was built near a military airfield, despite repeated U.S. warnings to Hanoi not to locate civilian structures near military areas).2 In addition, there were only 1,623 civilian casualties total during the entire 12-day operation--surprisingly small when compared to almost 84,000 people killed in one night during the fire bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 during World War II.3 Unfortunately, very little of this was ever explained to the American public by the news media at the time. This type of reporting damaged our foreign policy because it worked to distort and confuse the real issues. If our foreign policy is to be supported by the American people, our leaders must be more effective in dealing with the media to insure that our policies and actions are clearly and effectively explained to the people.