PARIS AGREEMENTS OF 1973

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND PRG EXPECTATIONS

In March of 1972, the North Vietnamese, along with the Vietcong, launched a powerful conventional offensive. The Communist leaders hoped it would knock the U.S. out of the war altogether, or at least might force the Nixon Administration to make further concessions in the long-stalled peace talks. North Vietnam's Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra, deputy commander of the Communist forces in the South, stated a year after the 1972 'Easter' offensive that 'The aim of the 1972 offensive was to force the U.S. to sign a peace agreement.'1

However, the offensive was a total disaster for the North Vietnamese and the Communist leaders were far from pleased with the results. Despite their investment of 120,000 North Vietnamese regular troops and thousands of Vietcong guerrillas equipped with Soviet artillery, rockets, and tanks, they failed to smash the South Vietnamese Army.2 Instead of driving the United States out of the war, the U.S. increased its actions and proceeded to step up the bombing of North Vietnam. In the end, U.S. air interdiction in the North and airlift and close air support in the South, especially during the battles of An Loc and Kontum, gave the South Vietnamese forces a distinct advantage over the Communist forces in 1972.3

Although the Communist forces made substantial gains in the rich and populous Mekong Delta, they failed to beat the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces as they had beaten the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Without this type of psychological knockout, they were in no position to dictate

peace terms.4 However, despite the staggering cost in human life of nearly 50,000 dead, and at least as many wounded, the 1972 offensive cracked the optimistic illusion of Vietnamization. To succeed on the battlefield, the South Vietnamese had to resort to the enormous reliance on U.S. air support and advisors. Thus, the 1972 offensive laid the groundwork for an eventual political deal and an ultimately successful future offensive in l975.5 After the failure of the 'Easter' offensive to defeat the U.S. and South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese decided on a compromise to break the deadlock in the peace negotiations; they would also use the 1972 Presidential Election to put pressure on U.S. negotiators--a period during which they felt that the pressure would be strongest for the U.S. to conclude negotiations at any price. In order to achieve a settlement, the North Vietnamese now considered offering a major concession: dropping their demand that South Vietnam's President Thieu must be removed before the fighting could stop (a demand that they had been making since the beginning of peace talks in 1969).6 By making this concession, the North Vietnamese leaders would succeed in getting the U.S. to leave South Vietnam and allow them to continue their struggle at a more favorable future date.

However, in typical Communist fashion, North Vietnam and the PRG, through the Giai Phong (Liberation) Press Agency, again pressed for his removal after Thieu refused to sign the accords agreed to in October 1972 by Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Le Duc Tho.7 The October draft of the accords called for an in-place cease-fire. Under this 'leopard spot' arrangement, the South Vietnamese and the Vietcong would hold the areas they controlled at the time of the cease-fire, pending a final settlement.8 It would also allow the North Vietnamese to leave an estimated 160,000 regular NVA troops in the South-- a key issue in North Vietnam's future bid for power and control of South Vietnam.9

However, President Thieu of South Vietnam refused to sign this agreement which allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South. He also gave Kissinger a list of 96 proposals to be made before he would sign the agreement.10 When Kissinger proposed these additional changes to Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese interpreted them as a 'breach of faith' and demanded that the October draft be signed in its original form without changes. A deadlock ensued and talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho stalled in December 1972.