APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW WITH BENJAMIN SCHEMMER

(Author of The Raid)

1. Question: Do you believe that President Nixon knew there were no POWs at Son Tay prior to mission launch?

Answer: The Nixon tapes, obviously, are the best source for that answer. Until you can check those out, I think Laird gave you the best insight possible into whether or not President Nixon knew there were no POWs in Son Tay just before the mission was launched (according to Peter Jeffrey, an archivist on the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff located at National Archives II, informed this author that, during the period of the Son Tay raid, Nixon had not yet installed his tape recording system in the White House and to his knowledge, no other personal recordings exist which cover the raid period).

2. Question: Do you believe there was an overriding political agenda associated with the raid?

Answer: No. I believe the overriding agenda was to free the POWs at Son Tay. I believe all other considerations were secondary at best --- except in the case of General Donald Blackburn, who, as I pointed out in The Raid, wanted to 'go' anyway because he thought it would really pull North Vietnam's chain (and Russia's to a lesser extent, by showing them that if they didn't 'shape up,' we could operate in their back yard with impunity).

3. Question: In your opinion, was the raid a 'Win-Win' proposition for the Administration regardless of 'risks' associated with its execution?

Answer: No. The Operation could have backfired badly in several ways. What if it had failed tragically --- many POWs killed, or the raiding force annihilated? It was definitely not a 'win-win' proposition, given all the things that could go wrong in the fog of war.

4. Question: Do you believe that the military actions taken in Cambodia, at Son Tay, and the resumption of bombing North Vietnam signaled a policy change to Hanoi from that of the stated policy of 'Vietnamization'?

Answer: Did it signal a policy change? In a large sense, Yes --- that we were exasperated over North Vietnam's intransigence on the POW issue and their treatment of our prisoners, and that the game might get very rough if they didn't change. And it's clear the North got the message, given the haste with which they rounded up all the POWs from the outlying camps and brought them together in Hanoi and treated them so much better.

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW WITH BENJAMIN SCHEMMER (CONT.)

(Author of The Raid)

5. Question: Could or would the American people support an escalation of the war focused on the single issue of returning POWs and opening dialogue concerning MIAs, and could this issue have been a rallying point for changing the character of the war?

Answer: Would Americans have supported an escalation of the war over the POW issue? I doubt it. Look at the flak Laird and the President took during the Fulbright hearings over Son Tay right after the raid, a very humanitarian mission. That was brutal! By then, after Cambodia, My Lai, Lam Son, etc., I think the ONLY escalation of any nature that MIGHT (though I doubt it) have won public support would have to deal DIRECTLY with bringing the POWs home. It was simply too late. Earlier, maybe; after 1970, I doubt it.

Additional Comments: In addition to this interview, Mr. Schemmer and this author had several telephone conversations where he seemed genuinely concerned and interested by this research topic, not to mention the fact that he was very professional and courteous. Mr. Schemmer's book, The Raid, is highly respected by all those who took part in the mission. Several cited sources testify to this belief and many share the opinion of retired USAF Colonel Frederic 'Marty' Donohue (commander of the lead H-53 on the raid and an acquaintance of this author) that, 'The Raid, is 100 percent accurate!'

This interview was conducted through electronic mail on 18 December 1996 between Mr. Schemmer and this author.