APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW WITH MELVIN R. LAIRD

(Secretary of Defense 1969-1973)

1. Question: Did the Son Tay Raid indicate a change in the political decision process?

Answer: Yes. Nixon's policy of withdrawal through negotiations would be pursued by military action if those negotiations did not produce the desired results. Nixon had done this with the bombings in Cambodia and would continue this type of 'strongman' tactic throughout his Presidency.

2. Question: Could the American public have supported a new war against Hanoi with the POW/MIA issue as the focal point?

Answer: Yes. I was the first to bring the issue to the full attention of the American public. We had been receiving information about the harsh treatment and in many cases, POWs dying in captivity. During 1969, three POWs were released which highlighted my concerns so I began to take action. Many in Congress and in the Administration disagreed with me because they did not want Hanoi to make a public issue out of the situation if pushed, since they believed Hanoi had the upper hand in this issue, thus putting the U.S. in a position to be dictated to in public. As it turned out, that is exactly what Hanoi did and that is part of the reason why I and the Administration went to Son Tay. We knew we had to do something.

3. Question: Was the Raid a 'Win-Win' situation for the President?

Answer: Yes. No POWs were killed and the raid force performed superbly through out the mission. If POWs had been at the camp we would have gotten them out. As it was, no POWs were there but the effects the raid had on the enemy were noticed almost immediately afterwards. Do you understand? The President followed through on his policy and the actual raid was a success. Do you understand? How could anyone not call it a success?

4. Question: How did the Raid affect future rescue operations?

Answer: Did you read Schemmer's book? We had discussed and even did some planning for another raid and you can bet this time we would bring POWs out. However, due to Son Tay, the POW/MIA issue began to move as real progress was seen at the political level and it was reflected in the overall peace talks. As a result of this progress, the idea of another raid gradually faded, after all, two years later most of the POWs had been released.

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW WITH MELVIN R. LAIRD (CONT.)

(Secretary of Defense 1969-1973)

5. Question: What message if any, did China and Russia receive as a result of the Raid?

Answer: The message was for Hanoi only. However, if China or Russia could bring pressure to bear on Hanoi in regards to the POW/MIA issue, that was okay too.

6. Question: Did you know at anytime prior to the Raid that no POWs were at Son Tay?

Answer: No. All the intelligence we had indicated that POWs were at the camp. I had been involved in this intelligence collection for quite some time and I had seen several other camps which we had been looking at for a long time. Son Tay gave no indication that POWs were not there. We knew the camp was active and had been for several years. The decision to execute was based on this intelligence. However, we knew that there was a possibility that no POWs were there. After all, we had no hard evidence of their presence, only indications from camps known to house POWs that were similar to the conditions and activity found at Son Tay. The raid force knew of this possibility also. Do you understand? I know what you are asking. The Hanoi information was simply not believable.

7. Question: Did you brief the President on the Hanoi source information?

Answer: No. The decision to go had already been made. Do you understand? I believed the information to be inaccurate. I informed the President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being held. The CIA passed that as many as 10 more POWs had died in captivity.

Additional Comments: Mr. Laird was very polite during correspondence prior to and during the interview. This author was honored by Mr. Laird's attention, concern, and thoughtfulness on this issue. Mr. Laird also said that he had personal files concerning the raid and the period while he was Secretary of Defense that would not be released until a future date.

This interview was conducted over the telephone on 17 December 1996. The interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. The answers provided by Mr. Laird are summations of the questions asked. The answers are not exact quotes. Rather, they were reconstructed from notes taken during the interview and at the best recollection of this author.