Admiral McCain's prediction would prove to be correct. As a result of the raid, conditions did change for the POWs. Hanoi began consolidating the POWs into fewer locations. Their harsh treatment eased dramatically. They were allowed to "socialize" freely at designated times and most were finally housed with roommates. Most began regularly receiving letters and packages from home while medical and health care improved. Finally, the POWs were allowed to hold organized physical training, administrative meetings and religious services on a much more regular basis. Needless to say, morale of the POWs soared. Apparently Hanoi got the message that America and the free world would never forget about the POWs and their suffering. On the basis of these improvements alone, many believed that the raid was worth the effort and was highly successful. However, at the same time, most POWs were not sure what triggered the sudden improvement in their treatment. Perhaps nothing would improve the morale and spirits of the POWs (short of being released) more than if they had knowledge of the attempted rescue at Son Tay. This opinion was confirmed following the release of the POWs several years later. A POW debriefing given by then Air Force Captain Sam Johnson (currently serving as a U.S. Congressman from Texas) perhaps best describes this fact. In 1966, Johnson was shot down over North Vietnam and became a POW at the "Hanoi Hilton." During the early hours of 21 November 1970, he recalled watching aircraft drop flares over Hanoi. He had not seen any activity like this since the bombing raids over North Vietnam had stopped nearly two years ago. Watching this attack did raise his hopes of liberation but it would not be until the summer of 1971 that the significance of the attack would be fully appreciated. He had recently received a box of hard candy from his wife.
I plopped one in my mouth and sucked on it. I felt something stiff, like a tiny plastic sliver, stick against the roof of my mouth. When I picked it out, I found it to be a tiny brown speck, about the size of a pinhead. I rubbed it between my fingers, and it began to unfold. Amazed, I rubbed some more. In seconds, it had opened to the width of 16mm film. It was microfilm of the front page of the New York Times telling all about the Son Tay raid. The young guys with good eyes could read it and give us the details. We knew then that our country had not forgotten us.
However, the reaction to the raid on the political home front was less popular. Political division over the raid served to further confuse not only the American public's understanding of the policy regarding Vietnam, but also highlighted the dissension between the two parties over the President's policy towards the war. Approximately half of the Washington law-makers apparently disapproved of the rescue attempt as political attention was focused on a hearing held by the politically powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
On 24 November 1970, Senator J.S. Fulbright (D-Arkansas), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, invited Secretary Laird to testify on the Son Tay raid and associated diversionary attacks. Fulbright believed a major escalation of the war had just occurred and no one was supplying the stated goals or desired outcome of the most recent military actions. The 15 members of the committee met to determine the intent of the administration's policy and the political implications of the raid. Fulbright personally believed that the only way to end the war was through a negotiated peace as the French had done in ending their involvement in Vietnam a decade and a half before. He was alarmed, as were most of the committee members, due to what now appeared to be very similar policies between the Nixon and Johnson Administrations on the conduct of the war. After all, Nixon had pledged to withdraw from Vietnam even though the recent military actions generated by his policy appeared to indicate otherwise. Specifically, Fulbright was concerned about the military actions which appeared to be contradictory to stated policy. Furthermore, this contradiction in policy seemingly confirmed his personal belief that neither President (Johnson and Nixon) wanted to be the one in the White House to "lose" America's first war. However, Fulbright's motives for the hearing appeared to be more political and personal than anything else. Little did Fulbright know at the time, but the spectacle created by the public hearing would generate a backlash of general criticism against him and the committee. Apparently the hearing served to further alienate the American public from its Washington leadership, ultimately sending conflicting signals of resolve to Hanoi and the rest of the world.
