At the Son Tay compound the prison assault force had completed its mission. At least 12 enemy had been killed, but more importantly, no POWs were found in or around the compound. A message of "negative items" was soon relayed to General Manor at his command-post located in South Vietnam. The only remaining tasks were to ensure that all raiders were accounted for, board the helicopters, and leave the area in the direction from which they arrived. The prison wall was breached and the H-3 was intentionally destroyed. The assault forces linked up with the H-53's and began their long trip back to Udorn. Three and a half months of intense training culminated in less than 30 minutes at Son Tay. The raid had taken 29 minutes to execute, one minute less than scheduled. Mission surprise was complete and undeniable. All the raiders who went in came out, with only two sustaining minor injuries. As the raiders returned to Thailand, their thoughts soon refocused as questions began to emerge. Why were there no POWs at Son Tay? Had Hanoi known they were coming? How would their efforts be perceived? The answers to most of these questions came soon enough, although several questions still remain unanswered.

Over 150 aircraft launched as part of the task force. Only two were shot down, but both pilots were recovered successfully by the egressing helicopters. As a result of the mission, American forces had suffered only two minor personnel injuries and the loss of two aircraft while Hanoi (China? USSR?) lost approximately 150 soldiers and sustained a huge blow to its sense of security. After all, the Americans had just conducted an operation at will in Hanoi's own backyard, catching them completely by surprise. A special "wake up" call had just been delivered. Nevertheless, most raiders initially felt dejected since they had not rescued any POWs. They believed the raid had been a failure even though they were highly praised and personally decorated for their efforts by President Nixon. It would take several months for many of the raiders to realize the overall importance of their mission. On the other hand, Hanoi publicly denounced the overall attack but made no initial mention of the Son Tay portion of the operation. Perhaps Hanoi was still confused or embarrassed over the Son Tay action. To many, Hanoi's response was its typical rhetoric which could never be publicly proven as fact. Except in this case, the raiders could testify to the actions taken at Son Tay. Furthermore, reaction to the raid and its results would have far reaching consequences not only for the raid force but also for both country's governments, the POW/MIA issue, and world opinion. Perhaps none was more significant and diverse than the impact on the American government and its military establishment.