Since August, the raid force had been training for a mission without knowing the exact location and purpose of their mission. Several members of the force believed they were going to Cuba to end the current dictatorship in one way or another. Due to the requirement for strict secrecy, the raiders would be "kept in the dark" until several hours prior to the launch of the raid. Moments before the final mission briefing, Colonel Simons told the assembled group that, "We are going to rescue as many as 70 American POWs, something American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers. The target is located just 23 miles west of Hanoi." For several seconds after the Colonel's remarks, an eerie silence fell over the room only to be followed by a loud standing ovation. One of the boldest military missions in history was about to unfold.

At approximately 2300 hours on 20 November 1970, all elements of Task Force Ivory Coast began departing on their assigned missions. Over 100 aircraft launching from bases and carriers flew missions in the vicinity of the Tonkin Gulf (east and southeast of Hanoi in the Haiphong harbor area, see Appendix C) where they dropped flares and chaff (used to disrupt and "blind" radar scopes). Bombing missions were not allowed due to the previously discussed "agreement." The deception plan worked perfectly as all "eyes" were turned eastward, allowing the low flying raid package to attack the camp undetected.

The raid force entered the Son Tay objective area below 500 feet. Suddenly, the MC-130's broke-off and dropped illumination flares over the camp area and then proceeded to a location approximately seven miles west of Son Tay where they dropped fire-fight simulators followed by a pallet of napalm, thus effectively illuminating the area and creating yet another diversion/deception. The A-1's attacked and destroyed a nearby bridge which would slow any reinforcement attempts made by local forces. Simultaneously, the lead H-53 crossed over the Son Tay prison and eliminated two occupied guard towers with its 7.62mm mini-guns (known as a GAU-2/B, a six barrel Gatling gun capable of firing either 2000 or 4000 rounds per minute). Behind the lead H-53, the H-3 made a controlled crash landing into the center of the camp. All personnel in the H-3 were unharmed with the exception of one of the crewmen who broke an ankle. The 14 raiders on board were the designated assault group and they immediately attacked the building containing the cell blocks, eliminating any remaining enemy personnel. These raiders were assigned to actually remove the POWs from their cells and guide them out of the compound through a hole in the prison wall created by a planned demolition. Once outside the camp, the POWs would be escorted to a nearby pick-up point and evacuated with the raid force.

Meanwhile, the second and third H-53's, which contained the second assault force, assigned to search and defend the surrounding camp area, began their landing. The only error made during the entire execution of the mission was about to occur. A compound located several hundred meters to the south of Son Tay was identified during the planning phase of the mission as a "secondary school." Upon this determination, the compound was immediately designated "off limits" to the raiders. However, this compound was very similar in shape and size to Son Tay. Because of this similarity, all aircrews and assault members were thoroughly briefed on the differences between the two locations. But due to the fog and friction of combat, the third H-53 containing Colonel Simons' assault force landed in the middle of the secondary school compound. The second H-53 did not land there because the aircrew saw the attack occurring at Son Tay at the last minute and corrected their course. For undetermined reasons (most likely for radio silence), the second H-53 did not relay this information to Simons' aircraft which was in trail of the second H-53. As Simons' assault force unloaded the helicopter, they came under immediate attack from the direction of the secondary school. The helicopter lifted off as planned, to await a later extract call from Simons. For the next five minutes an intense fire-fight developed at the secondary school compound. Realizing that the compound was not the prison camp and the school was not a secondary school, Simons ordered the H-53 to return for an emergency extract. Within minutes, all raiders were back on the helicopter heading for the prison camp. Remarkably, only one raider received minor wounds during the fight. As a result of this "error", over 100 enemy soldiers lay dead at the compound. Perhaps unknowingly, this mistake may have prevented a disastrous reinforcement of the Son Tay camp which would have been completely unexpected by the raid force. Additionally, the soldiers encountered at the school compound looked (uniforms and physical features to include language) and reacted differently than expected, raising the question whether the only enemy soldiers in North Vietnam were North Vietnamese. Simons immediately began asking questions of himself as to who they were and what they were doing in a secondary school which obviously was not being utilized as a school, or was it? Most people familiar with the raid believe that the soldiers encountered at the school compound were either Chinese or "Eastern" Russians providing "technical assistance" to North Vietnam's new and improved integrated air defense system (IADS), furnished by one or both of the communist superpowers.