THE STORY: ORGANIZING, PLANNING, EXECUTING

By the spring of 1970, more than 1400 Americans were listed as POW or MIA. Of the 1400, approximately 500 were being held in North Vietnam. With the war in Southeast Asia changing hands through the policy of Vietnamization, political and military concern grew as North Vietnam began to use the POWs as 'bargaining chips' more now than in previous years. In other words, Hanoi would use the POWs at the Paris Peace Talks to ensure America continued its scheduled withdrawal from South Vietnam.

By the spring of 1970, American and international awareness of the plight of the POWs had grown substantially and was perhaps at an all time high since the outbreak of the Vietnam War. Reports from the few POWs released or interviewed while in captivity revealed the harsh conditions, cruelty, and death threats that most of the POWs were subjected to on a daily basis. Anxiety, concern, and anger among the families and military/government leaders was more than evident as massive letter writing campaigns were directed at both Hanoi and the U.S. Congress in attempts to pressure both governments into action on this issue. After all, two years of talks had produced no POW exchanges or releases and in light of recent negative POW reports, something had to be done.

The military establishment was convinced what actions had to be taken in order to maintain the American fighting spirit for the remainder of the Vietnam War and future conflicts. Military intervention on behalf of the POWs would be required. Perhaps a successful rescue mission could provide a rallying point, giving the country an overdue and sorely needed positive perspective on the war. Perhaps the final 'straw' justifying a rescue came with the release of three POWs in late 1969. The information they provided about their treatment served to solidify the concept of a rescue as the only means to end the suffering of POWs. Therefore, Admiral Moorer directed General Blackburn to study the feasibility of a POW rescue mission. If viable, a raid would raise POW morale, act on the POW/MIA concerns of the American public, and hopefully convince Hanoi to release or improve the overall condition and treatment of all remaining POWs. Finally, it would demonstrate American resolve by solving/addressing all POW/MIA issues prior to America's departure from Southeast Asia.

In May 1970, Blackburn had concluded that a POW rescue was highly practical based on current military capabilities and could be successful provided strict secrecy concerning the mission was maintained. This proposal became known as Operation Polar Circle. JCS was delighted over the prospects, but their excitement was tempered by the likelihood of a negative American political reaction, especially in light of the established troop withdrawals. Due to this initial perception, approval to organize such a mission was delayed for several months until the idea had the appropriate political backing. Finally, in late July 1970, a Joint Contingency Task Group was formed and the operation received the code name Ivory Coast. Moorer briefed Laird on Ivory Coast and Laird immediately approved formation, training, and support of the rescue group. Within days, Laird briefed Nixon on the details of Ivory Coast. As previously discussed, Nixon agreed with the concept and placed Laird in charge of overseeing the mission while keeping Nixon informed on its progress prior to deployment. General Leroy Manor was selected to be the mission commander and Colonel 'Bull' Simons was appointed deputy commander and ground raid force commander.

Based on the previous feasibility study, a helicopter-borne raiding force augmented by fixed wing fire support under the cover of a deception plan designed to draw Hanoi's attention away from the selected POW camp could be successful. The primary raid group would consist of: one H-3 and five H-53 helicopters for transport of the raid force, two MC-130's for navigation and objective area support, two HC-130's for aerial refueling, five A-1E's for fire support, ten F-4's to provide MIG CAP (combat air patrol), and one F-4 (Wild Weasel) to draw the SAM's (Surface-to-Air-Missile) away from the raiding group. The ground raid force consisted of 59 hand-picked Green Berets. All raiders, including the aircrews, were volunteers. Approximately 500 personnel requested assignment to the force. Additionally, none of the volunteers knew exactly what they were going to do or where they were going to do it until several hours prior to the actual launch. Eglin Air Force Base was selected as the training sight; specifically, Auxiliary Field 3 was the location of their training. Coincidentally, some 28 years earlier Auxiliary Field 3 had hosted yet another daring group, known as 'Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders'. However, prior to commencement of training, a POW camp had to be identified.