INTELLIGENCE AND THE DECISION

Intelligence collection was essential because the decision to execute would be based almost entirely on the surveillance data. As a result of the surveillance, enemy strengths in the area were known, so most of the collection centered on POW activity at Son Tay. From May to November of 1970, collection revealed that the camp was 'active,' but hard evidence (photos of POWs at the camp or other definite signs) was never uncovered by any fly-overs prior to mission execution. Intelligence analysts believed that this camp housed POWs based on the observed activity and conditions of other POW camps positively known to contain prisoners. Additionally, secondary confirmation on the presence of POWs at Son Tay could not be achieved. Apparently the intelligence agencies involved in the mission had no other collection means (i.e., human intelligence) in the area specifically tasked to provide confirmation of the primary collection sources. Furthermore, it is unknown if special units (government or military) were 'delivered' into the area at any time prior to mission execution for surveillance and confirmation. It is highly unlikely that any such attempt was made because enemy detection of such a unit would compromise the mission. Based on intelligence collected during this time frame (May-November 1970), Generals Blackburn (Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA)) and Bennett (Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)) and Admiral Moorer (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)) recommended a 'Go' and forwarded their decision to Laird for approval. Blackburn, Bennett, and Moorer were members of the Pentagon action/decision group for the raid. This recommendation, followed by Laird's approval, allowed the raid force to deploy forward and await the execution order.

Meanwhile, no new developments had occurred in negotiations since Hanoi refused Nixon's offer on 7 October. However, on 13 November 1970, peace activist Cora Weiss was given the names of six known POWs who had died in captivity. The information was considered extremely reliable because it was provided by the North Vietnamese front organization known as The Committee of Solidarity with the American People. Justification for action was perhaps clearer now than ever before. Nonetheless, a final decision was needed since the tentative date for mission execution was 20-21 November (How the date was selected will be discussed later). At the urging of Blackburn, Laird finally decided to brief the President on 18 November, recommending execution of the mission. As Commander-in-Chief, Nixon was the only person who could approve mission execution. Admiral Moorer briefed Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, Richard Helms (Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)), and Secretary of State William Rogers on all information and details concerning the raid on Son Tay. Nixon was very receptive and took few notes during the meeting (Nixon was famous for carrying a yellow note pad; the more notes he took the less pleased he was about the topic). Moorer ensured that the President understood the raid was required and would be successful. Nixon did understand this and informed Moorer that he would give him his decision very soon. The 'Red Rocket' (NCA's execution message) needed to go out as soon as possible in order to give the raiders time to make final checks and be ready to execute by the 21st of November. As an indication of approval, Nixon asked, 'How many more POWs will we find dead if we wait much longer?' This question was an obvious reference to the 13 November information provided through Cora Weiss. After several moments with no response, Nixon stated, 'How could anyone not approve this?' Needless to say, the briefing as presented was an overwhelming success. If Hanoi would not negotiate on the POW/MIA issue willingly, then Nixon would take direct military action. One way or another, Nixon would force Hanoi to the negotiating table under conditions favorable to the U.S. and South Vietnam. Nixon was undoubtedly confident that the raid would bring success to his overall policy and specifically towards the POW/MIA issue. Nixon made the decision quickly. Within hours of the briefing, the 'Red Rocket' message went out from the Pentagon to the mission commander at 1730 hours, 18 November 1970. As if confirming the decision to execute, photo imagery taken on the evening of 18 November was interpreted as showing 'increased activity' at Son Tay. Perhaps if only for a moment, a 'warm and fuzzy' feeling contented the decision makers. However, within hours this feeling would be shattered. Once again, timing was everything!

During the evening of 18 November, General Bennett received information from a reliable source that Son Tay was not an active POW camp and no POWs were currently held there. The next day Bennett and Blackburn hastily attempted to confirm this information with additional unscheduled reconnaissance overflights of the target area. Bennett was convinced that this new information was accurate and correct, regardless of previous photo reconnaissance of the camp. Blackburn was somewhat critical of the new information, preferring to believe the results of past intelligence collection. So emphatic was Bennett's belief that he classified the information as B-3 (foreign source and usually reliable with direct access to the informant and information). Blackburn was still not convinced and would wait for the results of the unscheduled overflights. As fate would have it, weather and equipment problems would prevent any additional flights. Around mid-day (19 November), Bennett and Blackburn met with Admiral Moorer and relayed the latest developments. Moorer, aware of these developments, was obviously concerned and asked for their opinions on a 'Go' or 'No-Go' decision. Bennett was cautious, leaning towards a delay. Blackburn, on the other hand, still believed that 'someone' was at Son Tay and the mission should go. After all, Blackburn had a stack of information which indicated POWs were at Son Tay and now there was only a single piece of paper that indicated otherwise. Blackburn also saw the bigger picture in this decision. He would later recall, 'With a 95 to 97 percent confidence factor that the raiders could get in and out safely, it was worth the try even if the POWs were not there.' At least they would have tried to do something on behalf of the POWs. Little did Blackburn know at the time, but he and Nixon shared the same thought process on this issue. Having heard the opinions of both men, Moorer decided to brief Laird the following

morning. Hopefully, the additional time would allow for reconsideration and/or confirmation regarding to the new information. If confirmed to be accurate, enough time would be available on the morning of 20 November to brief the NCA and deliver any changes to the raid force prior to their scheduled launch time.

The following morning, Moorer, Bennett, and Blackburn again met to discuss the new developments. As it turned out, Bennett had a change of opinion. He had reconsidered his position based on all the information collected to date on Son Tay. Bennett arrived at the same conclusion Blackburn did on the day before. Therefore, Bennett recommended a 'Go.' That recommendation was enough for Moorer to agree that the mission should be attempted, since he also believed that the POWs were still there. It was good that all three 'confirmed' what they wanted to believe because the raid force mission commander had given the final preparation and execution order to the raid force earlier that morning. It is apparent that Moorer's decision to wait had paid off because anything less than a unified recommendation from his office probably would have led to an abort by the NCA. However, there was still enough time to do just that with another 'Red Rocket' if Nixon or Laird deemed it necessary in light of the Hanoi source information. Therefore, with Bennett at his side, Moorer went to brief Laird on the recent developments.