During the spring and summer of 1970, efforts to gain release of the POWs intensified as Nixon continued to apply pressure on Hanoi through diplomatic means. He was aware that if diplomatic pressure could not bring about the release of the POWs, then he would most likely have to use some type of military action as he had done in Cambodia. His decision on what type of action would elude him until the plan to raid a POW camp surfaced in July 1970.

As military planners continued to collect information and plan for a POW rescue, Nixon kept pressure on Hanoi by keeping the POW/MIA issue at the front of all negotiations (formal/informal to include secret meetings) in Paris. In July of 1970, Nixon received a briefing for a possible POW rescue attempt at the Son Tay camp. He was ecstatic about the raid, giving full authority and control of its conduct to Laird. Nixon now had a military means to effectively back up his policy of negotiations if Hanoi could not be convinced diplomatically to release the POWs. He would make one more attempt at negotiating a POW release before sending another "signal" to Hanoi.

On 7 October 1970 Nixon proposed "The immediate and unconditional release of all Prisoners of War held by both sides." This offer appeared to be extremely generous since Saigon held approximately 35,000 POWs to Hanoi's 3000. Hanoi refused the exchange. Once again, Hanoi would not recognize any of its POWs held in South Vietnam because they had stated on numerous occasions that North Vietnam had no forces in the South, be they regular army or Vietcong. As far as Hanoi was concerned, Saigon only had suspected Vietcong in their

prisons. Once again, the use of military force to forward Nixon's policy on the POW/MIA issue took center stage. The only decision remaining would be when to execute the raid in order to achieve the best possible political effect. After all, the target camp had been identified and the raiding force was nearing completion of their training for the mission.