LINKING THE POLITICAL STRATEGY TO SON TAY

Of all the issues involving the war, maybe none was more emotional and controversial than that of the POW and Missing in Action (MIA) situation. The White House realized this issue could have considerable positive political ramifications for the Administration if strengthened negotiations could quickly bring a solution leading to a POW release. However, since taking office, the Administration's efforts on this issue had produced no results despite the activity by domestic and international groups on the behalf of POWs and MIAs (see Appendix A). On 3 February 1970, believing that the time had come to

increase efforts on this issue, Nixon ordered the creation of a small, action-oriented team to, 'Concentrate full-time on all possible ways, conventional and unconventional, to bring to bear on the Hanoi government pressure sufficient to revert its view of American captives as an asset to one in which they are considered a liability.' This decision was the genesis for a study later conducted to examine the feasibility of a POW rescue. However, according to Secretary Laird, the original concept of a POW rescue was his idea, as he initiated low-level internal Department of Defense (DOD) planning for such a raid in late 1969 following Hanoi's release of three POWs. At the time, Laird directly controlled a special group in the Pentagon assigned to locate POW camps and track movement of POWs. Most of this activity was accomplished through the use of aerial reconnaissance. Regardless of authorship, the importance of establishing a POW action-team cannot be underestimated. First, it gave the organizers of the raid the needed political power to study, establish, train, and finally execute such a mission. Secondly, it allowed the development of policy options which the President could initiate through his continuing efforts to end America's involvement in the war.

Having sent Hanoi a clear message with the attack into Cambodia, Nixon focused on his policy of peace through negotiations from what he believed to be a stronger diplomatic position. From this stronger position, pressure concerning POW/MIA issues was applied through all available diplomatic channels. Nixon realized that Hanoi's treatment of POWs could be put in the 'spotlight' of not only domestic, but also international concern. Perhaps this single issue, once elevated and given the appropriate diplomatic priority, would cause a dramatic outcry in world opinion, thereby pressuring Hanoi to release all known POWs and provide information on MIAs. Nonetheless, Hanoi would fight Nixon's attempts step by step because Hanoi had stated repeatedly that the release of American POWs would be part of the final negotiated settlement to end the war. The POWs would not be treated as a separate issue. In other words, Hanoi would use the POWs as bargaining chips until the U.S. was 'fully committed' (a term Hanoi never publicly defined) to withdrawal or even perhaps until all U.S. forces had departed South Vietnam.