First, Nixon would adopt Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's term of "Vietnamization" by officially establishing the policy of turning the war over to South Vietnam to prosecute as "their" fight with assistance from the U.S., much like what America provided during the early days of the conflict prior to 1964 (military equipment and advisors). Nixon believed this first step would appease congressional critics and stifle the anti-war movement. By taking this unilateral action, Nixon was "placing the ball in Hanoi's court" as a sign of good faith, hoping that this initiative would produce meaningful negotiations in future sessions at Paris. Second, he put Vietnam at the center of American foreign policy. Any international policy activity would include some stance or action favorable to an independent South Vietnam. In other words, negotiations with any country or government would not be conducted or concluded unless some aspect of support concerning South Vietnam was part of the final settlement. Nixon exploited this aspect to his advantage since China and the USSR were looking to expand trade agreements and begin talks on limiting strategic weapons with America. Thus he used both countries to put pressure on Hanoi to cooperate through negotiations. Finally, Nixon would reinforce his policies of Vietnamization and international diplomatic pressure through an honorable settlement of the war by "massive military retaliation" if Hanoi did not negotiate in good faith or attacked American forces in the South. It seems as if Nixon was declaring and perhaps even establishing an unofficial cease-fire with the implementation of Vietnamization. However, would Hanoi receive the same message, and if so, would they be motivated or compelled to cooperate?

Anticipating that Hanoi would elect to "misinterpret" or not "fully understand" his actions, Nixon would back up the threat of massive military retaliation through his "madman theory." H.R. Halderman, Nixon's Chief-of-Staff, would recall how this theory was to be employed. Nixon said, "We'll just slip the word to them (directly referring to Hanoi and indirectly to the USSR and China) that, "for god's sake," you know Nixon's obsessed about communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry, and you know he has his hand on the nuclear button." A very risky theory indeed. However, Nixon believed he could keep China and the USSR at bay on such an issue, considering the upcoming negotiations on limiting strategic weapons. This author could not conclusively determine if either country ever directly "called" Nixon's threat of a nuclear strike or how his "madman theory" affected the outcome of future negotiations. Nevertheless, would Nixon have really "nuked" North Vietnam or any other country for that matter if his "madman theory " had been put to the test? A most interesting question indeed, but beyond the scope of this paper.

Regardless, Nixon believed that he must send a strong signal to Hanoi that he was serious about his new policy and that Hanoi should be equally serious. Nixon's eagerness to send a signal was obvious since, according to Roger Morris, a staff member of the National Security Council (NSC), "He (Nixon) was obsessed with the idea that the other side was trying to push him around. Hanoi would not negotiate if the U.S. could not convince them that they could not win on the battlefield." However, determining what signal to send would be somewhat difficult. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended resuming the bombing campaign of North Vietnam but Nixon initially refused due to the similarity of this option with that of the Johnson Administration. A plan to attack into Cambodia and destroy Hanoi's "known" sanctuaries located there soon surfaced through the Joint Chiefs. Although not a new idea, the military leadership still believed that if Hanoi retained staging areas in Cambodia and could not be soundly defeated there, regional stability and the governments of Cambodia and South Vietnam were at greater risk of collapse than in previous years of the war. Nixon bought the idea totally. The attack into Cambodia fit perfectly into his policy because it was something completely unexpected by Hanoi. The option could accomplish two things; one, catch Hanoi by surprise and two, destroy critical war supplies. The signal would be clear; not even Hanoi could misinterpret this action. On 18 March 1969, a secret bombing campaign commenced into Cambodia. Without a doubt, Hanoi now knew that the new American President would carry on the war in a different manner and was serious about his policy plan for ending the war. Although effective, the bombing of Cambodia backfired on Nixon because of the manner in which it was revealed to the American public. Nixon wanted to keep the bombings secret until the effects felt by Hanoi resulted in a new round of meaningful negotiations in Paris. If successful, Nixon would appear as a powerful President, making good on his political promise to quickly end the war. Instead, the American public was made aware of the bombings by the media even before the operation was over. As a result, many believed that the policy of Vietnamization was really a policy of escalation and Nixon had betrayed their trust and broken his campaign promise of withdrawal. Thus, a new round of anti-war demonstrations, public confusion, and distrust of the government's handling of the war began. Perhaps this situation was avoidable. Laird disagreed with the President that the bombings should be kept a secret until the operation ended. He understood that once the first bomb dropped, thousands of people would immediately know about the new bombings. No one could keep something like that secret, especially when the operation would take several months to complete. Consequently, when the news broke, Laird was accused of leaking the attack since he opposed its secrecy. Laird vehemently denied the White House accusation. Nonetheless, the Administration had egg on its face. Realizing the deteriorating situation, Nixon quickly shifted political focus and began repairing the domestic damage to his reputation and policy. In hindsight, it is apparent that Nixon could have been the hero if before the bombing he had informed the public of his policy and his intentions instead of waiting to demonstrate his political prowess after the fact. Notwithstanding, the signal received by Hanoi was clear since the bombings were unexpected and effective in destroying supplies and disrupting military activity. Hanoi now knew that, "at will" the U.S. could severely impede their war efforts. Perhaps the time was right for Hanoi to begin serious negotiations. Otherwise they might risk defeat at the hands of a new and obviously determined American President. With Nixon having firmly established a new policy towards Vietnam, fresh diplomatic attempts to settle unresolved issues (peace talks, troop withdrawal, military aid, POW/MIA, etc.) began to surface. In order to maintain pressure on the Hanoi government, the next step in Nixon's policy would need to be as assertive and surprising as the previous measure.