Andrew F. Krepinivich, Jr. in The Army and Vietnam writes a scathing indictment of the U.S. Army for failing to fight the Vietnam war as the situation dictated. Throughout his book he accuses Army leaders of failing to properly apply the strategy and tactics of counterinsurgency. "Deeply imbedded in the service's psyche, conventional operations held sway over the Army... "(5:164) He maintains that the Army intended to fight an attrition war and "...gambled that it could attrite insurgent forces faster than the enemy could replace them..."(5:177) The Marine Corps on the other hand, conducted a war based upon its previous experience in fighting insurgents.(5:172)

Two of the key Marine Corps leaders, Major General Lewis W. Walt and Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, did have a clear view of how to conduct a counterinsurgency war. Krulak, as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, wrote several letters to senior administration officials outlining Marine programs and emphasizing the necessity of conducting counter-insurgency operations. He also was a staunch supporter of Gen Walt, then Commanding General Of the Third Marine Division and III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) in Vietnam, when he was conducting a number of programs to defeat the Viet Cong (VC) in I Corps in northern South Vietnam. It is impossible to determine if the strategy of the Marines could have won the war. Certainly, without similar efforts by the Army in the rest of Vietnam, I Corps would have been an oasis of counterinsurgency in a desert of attrition warfare. This does not negate the Marine strategy. The Marine strategy for Vietnam contained many of the important elements necessary to effectively conduct a counterinsurgency war.