POSTSCRIPT

One outstanding question remains. The question relates to the ability of the United States to act as a constructive and reliable partner in assisting a country faced with an insurgency. A country seeking support should be concerned that it receives consistent and reliable support, generally free of demands for social and administrative reform. In South Vietnam, over the period of this study, the United States was unable to meet these requirements. Support was neither consistent nor was it properly related to the true nature of the problem. Instead of being aimed at the root causes of the insurgency, the aid effort was seriously diluted by a focus on the threat of a conventional invasion from the north. In 1963 the threats to withdraw support indicated the unreliable nature of the United States as a country providing support. The United States was unable to commit itself to a long term view of the problem even though it was recognized that, as in Malaya, the problems of insurgency could not be solved overnight.

The demands for social and political reforms placed on President Diem demonstrated the intolerance of the United States for a political system other than one modeled on its