EVALUATION PROCEDURES OF THE TIME

The most obvious problem with evaluating strategic hamlets in the period 1961 to 1963 was the narrow view of what constituted a completed strategic hamlet. In Chapter 4, the six points presented by the government as the criteria for a completed strategic hamlet were noted. Apart from the inclusion of the election of an advisory counci1. the governments criteria made no mention of the economic, social, and political components of the program. Yet these three components are arguably the most Important aspects of any pacification program. To have an inadequate or non-existent means of evaluation did not allow effective monitoring, or any means of modifying or improving the program as it was implemented.1

In the early stages of the Strategic Hamlet Program, there was very little attention paid to evaluating the performance of the hamlets in achieving pacification. The program was introduced with a great a deal of hope as a "total revolution" and as a means of averting the increasing Viet Cong threat in the countryside. In this type of environment, it is hardly surprising that the early emphasis was on getting the hamlets completed. This was reinforced by the attitudes of Diem and Nhu. who viewed success in terms of numbers of hamlets completed rather than in terms of a strategic hamlet's ability to ensure effective pacification. Robert Thompson observed in 1966, " No