restoration of internal security as the primary problem and, in reference to the Agrovilles. made the observation:

Its solution also demands stepped-up economic and social action, especially in rural areas, closely Integrated with the military action. For example, one of the more promising counter-guerilla methods tried up to this time involves regrouping scattered rural populations into more readily defensible communities so designed and assisted as also to offer improved opportunities for livelihood.16

While a flurry of activity continued in Washington, Diem, in Saigon, became convinced that the situation was worsening, and he stressed the need for more United States assistance to further increase his military forces. In an effort to gather more information. President Kennedy decided to send his personal military advisor. General Maxwell D. Taylor, to Vietnam. General Taylor was accompanied by Walt W. Rostow, the Presidents Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, and a staff representing both the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

In his report submitted to the President on 3 November 1961, General Taylor covered a wide variety of subjects and made many proposals. What was most striking about his proposals was the recognition that "what is now required is a shift from U.S. advice to limited partnership and working collaboration with the Vietnamese."17 He proposed a change in the charter, the spirit, and the organization of the MAAG; a change which was, in effect, a