This theme of an all-encompassing program was reiterated In July of 1963, when President Diem referred to the "total revolution policy of the strategic hamlets."3 By the end of 1963, Diem was dead and his "total revolution" was in disarray. By all appearances, the Strategic Hamlet Program had failed. This study will examine the different security, economic, social. and political components of the Strategic Hamlet Program to determine why it failed.

DEFINITIONS

In this study Pacification, literally meaning to reduce to a state of peace, will refer to all of the efforts by the Government of Vietnam to restore and maintain law and order in the countryside. Pacification programs should seek to provide sustained protection for the rural population from insurgent threats. At the same time. a pacification program should aim to engender support for the government by meeting the needs of the people. In concept a pacification program should be a civil, as wel1 as a military project. properly coordinated, carefully planned, and adequately resourced. Just as the South Vietnamese and the United States did, this study assumes pacification to be a viable counterinsurgency strategy.

Some authors. such as U.S. Army officer and historian. Rod Paschall, have suggested that economic development may not be essential to the success of a counter insurgency effort. Paschall argues that some insurgencies have been put down solely by brute force,4