ALTHOUGH the United States contended that counterinsurgency operations should be combated through a combination of military operations and social reform, the demands of tactical operations in the Vietnam War remained the most important concern of the US Army. The focus on combat action was especially true from the middle of 1966 when US forces launched their first prolonged offensive, through late 1968 when 'Vietnamization' of the war began in earnest. During the intervening period, South Vietnamese troops emphasized pacification duties while US units carried the brunt of the major fighting. In late 1968, South Vietnamese units began assuming an increasing responsibility for military operations. This responsibility continued to increase until the last US ground troops withdrew in August 1972.

Because of strategic and political considerations, the ground strategy remained that of a gigantic mobile defense. The strategy sought to defeat the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) forces and to permit the people of South Vietnam to manage their own affairs. Tactical operations within the mobile defense were predominately offensive, for the essential idea was to find and destroy the enemy. Such operations theoretically enabled the government of South Vietnam to extend its control over the people within an area. Military operations were thus an inherent part of the pacification effort even though their contribution to the pacification effort was often not immediately apparent at the local or village level.127

From the moment the US Marines first entered South Vietnam in March 1965, the war was characterized by its nonlinear and multidirectional nature. Following the arrival of the 173d Airborne Brigade in May 1965, American tactical operations concentrated on defeating or destroying the enemy within, an area rather than capturing terrain features or conventional objectives. Consequently, tactical methods were usually very different from those previously envisioned for a limited war, especially one similar to the Korean Conflict. Although tactical methods intended for a general war in Europe were often not applicable to combat operations in South Vietnam, the American movement toward a more dispersed battlefield in the 1950s proved to be a fortunate development.

By the early 1960s, major advances had been made in tactical communications, and when this was coupled with the great mobility of the helicopter, larger unit commanders were able to control their subordinate units in a fashion heretofore impossible. The improved communications, greater flexibility in command and control, increased American mobility and the nature of the enemy ensured that tactical operations in South Vietnam often bore little resemblance to those of the past.