In the summer of 1953, Navarre had 189,000 troops in Indochina: 54,000 French soldiers, 20,000 Legionnaires (many of whom were German or Eastern European), 30,000 North Africans (Algerians and Moroccans), 10,000 air force and 5,000 navy personnel, and 70,000 members of the Vietnamese National Army. Most of these were needed to man garrisons throughout Indochina, particularly along a chain of defensive positions in the Red River delta called the De Lattre Line. The Vietminh, with 6 divisions and 3 independent regiments, had at least 80,000 well-trained first-echelon soldiers, along with a large body of second-echelon militia available for regional conflicts and activity. These, in turn, were backed by large portions of the peasant population whose support the Vietminh had already won.

Navarre's long-term plan for defeating the Vietminh envisioned limited offensive operations by his regulars to keep Giap's forces occupied while the French rebuilt the Vietnamese National Army in 1954. Then, in 1955, he would mount a general offensive to destroy Ho Chi Minh's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Prior to Navarre's arrival in country, the French had achieved some success against the Vietminh by creating forward operating bases behind enemy lines. An airhead, seized by an airborne insertion, would be rapidly expanded by airlifting in artillery, engineer, and support elements, as well as regular infantry units to replace the paratroopers. The French then would conduct limited local offensive actions disrupting the Vietminh rear and causing PAVN units to attack their positions in force. Next, the French would use the inherent strength of the defense and their superiority in firepower, both artillery and air support, to inflict heavy losses on their opponents. When this was accomplished, the operation would terminate, and the entire French contingent would be withdrawn by air.

The key to this kind of operation was to choose a provocative site, man it with sufficient forces to prompt the enemy to attack (and thus accept an attrition battle), and then retain the ability to withdraw the force when necessary. The French had employed these successful tactics before Navarre's appearance. Navarre now intended to intensify these tactics and expand their scope. In the autumn of 1953, Navarre selected Dien Bien Phu as the centerpiece for his plan to engage the Vietminh in northern Vietnam.

On 20 November, elements of the 1st Airborne Battle Group jumped into Dien Bien Phu. Within two weeks, nearly 5,000 French troops were in the valley, improving two airstrips and building defensive positions. Navarre's trap was set. The bait was six battalions of airborne infantry, the cream of the French Army in Indochina.

Ho and Giap carefully analyzed the situation before accepting battle. They determined that the French strength was in fire support, both artillery and air power, and that the French weakness lay in their extended and vulnerable lines of communication (LOCs). The Vietminh leaders also considered their own position and identified their strengths as their skilled infantry and the support of the people. Their weaknesses were their lack of firepower and their inability to sustain large-scale conventional operations. Therefore, the Vietminh leaders decided that victory at Dien Bien Phu would depend on their ability to reduce the effectiveness of French fire support and to sever the enemy's lines of supply while, at the same time, reinforcing their own firepower and protecting their own LOCs. Less than a week after the first French paratroopers jumped into Dien Bien Phu, Giap ordered four divisions to converge on the valley, to arrive no later than the end of December: the Vietminh had accepted the challenge.