which Marine CAP and CUPP units had tried to develop into independent and self-sufficient units. While General Lam's forces were much improved, they were still relatively limited in number to control effectively a military region that was 220 miles long and from 30-75 miles wide. In spite of that, the ARVN seemed to be holding their own as Marine redeployment moved forward, and the RFs and PFs began to conduct more offensive operations. There were still ominous indicators that, while the enemy appeared to be in decline, the GVN had demonstrated only limited capability of winning the war with far less American assistance.
As measures of RVNAF progress, the allied offensives into enemy sanctuaries within the boundaries of border nations during 1970-1971 achieved some success but also demonstrated Vietnamese weakness and left lingering doubts whether the escalating pace of redeployment was compatible with the progress of Vietnamization. The invasion of base areas in Cambodia in 1970 cost the enemy dearly in men, arms, ammunition, and supplies and rendered him temporarily incapable of mounting an offensive. The South Vietnamese move into Laos in February and March 1971 was less successful, even though MACV estimated that the NVA lost some 13, 000 killed to the rvnaf's reported 1, 500.
Evaluating the VNMC performance in Laos during Operation Lam Son 719, American Marine advisors observed that the companies and battalions fought well, but the brigades and the division exhibited many of the deficiencies apparent in other Vietnamese forces. Relative to the progress of Vietnamization, therefore, Lam Son 719 showed clearly that body counts and other statistical measurements of battlefield performance could not necessarily be translated into conclusions concerning operational success or failure. In the broader analysis Lam Son 719 unveiled the grave weakness that Marines had observed in the RVNAF In large-scale operations; the inadequacies in high level staff work; the questionable ability to maneuver effectively units of greater than battalion size; the reluctance of commanders to delegate authority to staffs; the absence of long-range logistical planning; the disregard for the rudiments of supply discipline; and the inability to exercise communications security. Lam Son 719 also revealed the technological dependence— tactically and logistically—that the United States had bred into the RVNAF.
For the U.S. Marines this 18-month period was one of dramatic change, aside from the total draw-down of the remaining 55, 000 Marines in III MAF. Lieutenant General John R. Chaisson, who was Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps in May 1971, remarked of this stage of the war, "We had adopted, from 1969 on, the idea that we were in the postwar period."77 Following the redeployment of 1969, the focus in 1970-1971 for the Marine Corps, therefore, was finely balanced between maintaining tactical control of Marine areas of operation while encouraging Vietnamization, and conducting a systematic and orderly redeployment, a gargantuan task, especially for logisticians.
Acting on General Chapman's guidance to take every item worth five dollars or more with them, III MAF logistical planners meticulously inspected and inventoried material, dismantled installations, redistributed equipment, and transferred facilities and real estate from January 1970 to June 1971. The III MAF Redistribution Center, created in May 1970 to reduce excesses of equipment before the redeployment, coordinated the transfer of Marine Corps gear valued at $50, 409, 000 and numbering over 325, 000 separate teems. Most of these went from Vietnam to Marine commands, ranging from the Western Pacific to the west coast of the United States. The 3d MAB ended ground combat operations, other than local security around installations, on 7 May 1971. Within three weeks Marine combat air operations ceased and by 4 June all Marine real estate had been turned over to either the ARVN or the U.S. Army The last units of the 3d MAB left Vietnam by sea and air on 25 and 26 June. Only Sub-Unit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company; the Marine Advisory Unit; the Embassy Marines; a handful of technicians; and Marines on the MACV staff remained, For the Marine Corps, the war reverted to an advisory effort.
