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Page 362(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page


Marine Corps Historical Collection

LtGen Henry W, Buse, Jr., and his successor as commanding general. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, LtGen William K. Jones, a former 3d Division commander, salute the colors during the change of command ceremony at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii in June 1970.

rine Corps. Lieutenant General McCutcheon interpret­ed the policy as 'a restatement of what we are doing,' which meant that 'the first minor offender, one time experimenter or possessor of inconsequential amounts,' at the unit commander's discretion, could be given a second chance. 'If he does straighten up, he stays and if not, then he goes out.'86 Other com­manders nevertheless, felt themselves constrained by Chapman's directive to adopt a very harsh policy in spite of dislike for its implications. Colonel Hugh S. Aitken, 1st Marine Division G-l, summed up the problem in March 1971:

Is the one-time experimenter a kid that smokes a mari­juana cigarette; or is the one-time experimenter a kid that docs it for a weekend; or is the one-time experimenter the kid that goes on a week-long jag on marijuana and never touches it again . . .? And what is the user . . .? We arc putting a lot of youngsters out of the Corps with undesira­ble ... type discharges, without, I believe, a clear under­standing of the policy at all levels. And the policy ... is being interpreted in the extreme ....87

Even more serious, according to Major General Armstrong, the Commandant's policy, by eliminating any incentive for users to surrender voluntarily, hin­dered the discovery and removal of drug addicts from units. Late in 1970, Armstrong deliberately went against CMC policy to deal with an immediate crisis. A 'rash' of drug-related incidents in MAG-16, in Arm­strong's opinion, had 'reached the stage . . . of creat­ing a possible danger to flight operations.' The group executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Guay, with the consent of the group commander and the assistance of the chaplain and medical and legal officers, proposed a temporary amnesty as a 'short-range solution' to reducing drug use. Armstrong authorized implementation of the plan, under which Marines who came forward of their own free will were kept out of the disciplinary system and received aid from a group drug action team. At the end of Febru­ary 1971, the MAG-16 chaplain, Lieutenant John B. Fitzgerald, reported: 'The . . . program combating drug abuse is showing its effectiveness. Both chaplains, legal [officers], flight-surgeons, and Squadrons arc working together.' Marines who asked for help took



Page 362(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page



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