Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective
eHistory Book Reviews
MultiMedia Histories

eHistory Archive Logo
THESE ARE ARCHIVED PAGES OF THE OLD EHISTORY SITE
click here for the NEW eHistory site
These pages are not actively maintained and may have errors in content and functionality
icon: the new eHistory
click to see our Origins feature click to see our Multimedia histories click to see our Book Reviews
Ancient History Middle Ages Civil War World War II Vietnam War Middle East World
      eHistory  >  Vietnam War Search


Page 361(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page


chaplain's representatives. Formally constituted drug abuse education contact teams traveled from unit to unit. In the 1st Marine Division, according to Gener�al Simmons, 18, 000 Marines heard the division drug presentation during 1970. "In other words," he report�ed, "just about every Marine hears this lecture at least once during his tour in Vietnam. How much good does it do? I'm not sure."81

Where education failed, III MAT resorted to punishment. Units routinely searched vehicles enter�ing and leaving their compounds for hidden drugs and conducted inspections of troop living and working areas. When they could, they arrested and prosecut�ed Marines who sold or regularly used drugs. Finding the offenders, however, and obtaining evidence against them proved difficult, since peer pressure and outright threats inhibited enlisted men against testifying. American military justice could not touch Vietnamese suppliers. Marines who were caught dealing in or us�ing drugs received courts-martial or administrative dis�charges* under a general policy of purging from the ranks Marines with any degree of drug involvement. Only first offenders or "one-time experimenters" at the commander's discretion,** might undergo light�er punishment and secure a chance to redeem themselves3

During late 1970, this policy became a subject for debate within and outside the Marine Corps. Some officers at the working level viewed strict enforcement of punishment and discharge as a waste of trained men. A communications officer in charge of Marines specially cleared to work with classified messages point�ed out: "If a guy was caught with drugs he'd lose his clearance and then that was one less worker . . ., so it was very painful to us to have a highly skilled kid busted."83 Increasingly, commanders and medical officers came to view drug abuse as a medical and so�cial problem rather than a crime and suggested that users who voluntarily asked for help be exempted from punishment and offered rehabilitation assistance. Such a policy could rescue valuable military manpower and prevent the dumping back into society of ex-servicemen handicapped by drug dependence and un�favorable discharges. By mid-1970, a number of Army commands in the United States and at least one divi�sion, the 4th, in Vietnam, had instituted amnesty and treatment programs for users who turned themselves in. In August 1970, a DOD military/civilian task force on combating drug abuse included amnesty in its list of recommendations.84

Until well after the redeployment of the 3d MAB, the Marine Corps took an adamant stand against am�nesty. On 10 October 1970, General Chapman stated this position in a strongly worded message to all com�mands; "The Marine Corps cannot tolerate drug use within its ranks. Those who experiment with drugs can expect to be punished. Those who become addict�ed will be separated .... Both types of user introduce unnecessary operational risk, as well as an unwhole�some environment." Concerning rehabilitation Chap�man added:

The Marine Corps is neither funded nor equipped to carry the burden of noneffective members for the inordinate length of time that civilian institutions are finding necessary to achieve the rehabilitation of addicts- Even then the reversion rate is discouragingly high. In any case our medi�cal resources are sufficiently taxed by duty-connected phys�ical problems without intentionally taking on clinical or rehabilitative responsibilities .... As Marine Corps strength reduces to a post-Vietnam commitment level, the premi�um on professionalism goes even higher. We will only en�list or retain those who will conscientiously meet and maintain high Standards. Drug users do not fit into that category."5

Within III MAP, General Chapman's policy state�ment created much confusion and disagreement, es�pecially over what degree of drug abuse should be considered sufficient to dictate expulsion from the Ma-

*Drug possession and use were absolutely contrary to regulations and the UCMJ. Article 1270 of the Naval Regulations prohibited possession and use of narcotics, except for authorized medical pur�poses, on board any Navy ship or installation and by any member of the Naval Service. The UCMJ defined possession or use of mariju-ana or any other habit-forming narcotic as an offense under Article 134. Paragraph 213b, "Disorders and Neglects to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline in the Armed forces," Convicted nar�cotics offenders could receive maximum sentences of dishonorable discharge, confinement for 10 years at hard labor, reduction to pri�vate, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Marijuana offenders were subject to identical punishment, but with a maximum im�prisonment of five years. In the Marine Corps, addiction, habitual use, or unauthorized use or possession of narcotics were grounds for administrative "discharge for unfitness," along with sexual perver�sion, shirking, failure to pay debts, and repeated infection with venereal disease. An unfitness discharge was ordinarily an undesirable discharge. Alcoholism, by contrast, entailed an unsuitability dis�charge, which normally was honorable or general. Marine Corps .Separation and Retirement Manual (MCO P1900.16, 1968), paras 6016-6018. ** The CMC on 9 February 1970 permitted alt commanders ex�ercising general courtmartial Jurisdiction to authorize or direct retention or direct discharge of any enlisted man Involved with narcotics use or possession. Previously administrative discharges for narcot�ics involvement had required HQMC review and approval. CMC msg to ALMAR, dtd 9Feb70, Ftdr 1900 (HQMC Central Files).



Page 361(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page



About | Contact


All images and content are the property of eHistory at The Ohio State University unless otherwise stated.
Copyright © 2012 OSU Department of History. All rights reserved.