near hamlets that characterized the war in Quang Nam, it was all too easy for women, children, or old people to be hit by stray bullets and grenades. Keyed up Marines in night ambushes found the impulse to fire at any moving figure difficult to resist, even though the moving figure could be a child violating curfew rather than an attacking Viet Cong. Employ�ment of air strikes and artillery fire, necessary to hold down Marine casualties, could also kill and maim large numbers of noncombatants. On 15 April 1970, for in�stance, Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines en�gaged enemy troops near Le Bac (2), about five miles northeast of An Hoa. The company called in jets and Cobra gunships; a dozen enemy troops died in the action, but so did about 30 people in the nearby hamlet.*12
In an effort to avoid such tragedies, MACV and its subordinate commands, Including III MAP, early in the war had issued elaborate rules of engagement (ROE), prescribing procedures for employing all types of weapons and for humane treatment of prisoners and noncombatants. All commands were supposed to train and retrain their troops in these procedures and prin�ciples. The 1st Marine Division, in an order issued in March 1968 and still in effect in 1970, required its subordinate units to Include ROE instruction in the Initial orientation of newly arriving troops and to pro�vide refresher training in this subject to each Marine every two months during his Vietnam tour. The divi�sion syllabus, based on the MACV ROE, emphasized employment in all situations of the minimum force required for self-protection or mission accomplishment and enjoined "patient and compassionate" treatment of Vietnamese civilians.13
The public uproar in the United States over My Lai led to new command interest in enforcing the ROE and the laws of war, especially after the Army investi�gation of the massacre cited lax or nonexistent instruc�tion in these subjects as a contributing cause.** In the 1st Marine Division, according to Major General Wid-decke, concern over the legal, moral, and tactical im�plications of My Lai created "an atmosphere of uncertainty" among newly arrived lieutenants. "This uncertainty," Widdecke reported on 28 April to Gener�al McCutcheon, "is illustrated by a question often asked during advanced indoctrination training, 'What is an atrocity?'" An increased division concern over civilian casualties, Widdecke continued, "impacts directly both on planning and on clearances for fire missions; and may result in targets not attacked for lack of positive identification on the remote possibil�ity of injury to noncombatants."14
On 13 May 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon, responding to the Son Thang (4) and other incidents, sent a message to all III MAF unit commanders. In it, he emphasized that "It is imperative that measures to preserve the lives and property of noncombatants receive constant command attention." McCutcheon directed all commanders to review the rules of engage�ment and "ensure strict compliance with their provi�sions." He concluded by repeating: "Continuing command attention Is mandatory."15
Whatever the degree of command effort and effec�tiveness in carrying out these Instructions, it was difficult to translate the principles of the ROE into terms meaningful to the individual Marine on patrol or in ambush. The 4th Combined Action Group, lo�cated in Quang Tri Province, made a determined at�tempt to do this. On 16 May 1970, the group instituted a new ROE Instruction program for all its Marines and corpsmen. Instruction was based on 19 specific tactical questions and answers, most of which emphasized the need to identify targets before open�ing fire. The tactical catechism, which was to be con�sidered "directive in nature," Included such questions as:
Q. While in ambush position, you see a human figure at 200 meters moving toward you. The figure appears to be armed, but cannot be further identified. Should you shoot?
A. No. Wait for the target to get closer, and make use of the starlight scope to identify the target. Only when you are reasonably sure the target is enemy may you shoot. If need be. when the target is at its closest point, use a challenge or illumination in an effort to identify the target.
Q. While in an ambush position, an unarmed person wear�ing civilian clothes walks into the killing zone. Should you shoot him?
A. No. This is probably just a curfew violator. Curfew vio�lators do not rate being shot. Curfew violators should be halted by a challenge and apprehended, preferably by a PR
* The 1st Marine Division launched an investigation of this inci�dent, after civilians reported it to the OP on Hill 119. Viet Cong radio broadcasts in May claimed Le Bac (2) had been another My Lai-style massacre; the 1st Marine Division established, however, that the civilian casualties had been caused by the air strikes, not by small arms fire.
** In the years immediately after the Vietnam War, all the Ser�vices, under DOD direction, improved the amount and quality of the training of their personnel in the basic laws of war and in the procedure for reporting war crimes by both United States and enemy forces, for a brief survey of these efforts, see Maj W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities." Marine Corps Gazette, Jul- and Aug76. passim.
