on behalf of certain parties to the case, that it became somewhat of a cause celebre"6

After an informal investigation. Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Cooper, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines com­mander, on 23 February removed Lieutenant Ambort from command of Company B. The following day, the battalion convened a formal pretrial investigation un­der Article 52 of the UCMJ* and charged the five members of the patrol with murder. At the same time, the office of the Division Staff Judge Advocate ap­pointed an investigating officer and furnished mili­tary lawyers as counsel for both the government and the defendants.9

Reports of the charges in the American press pro­voked letters of protest to Marine Corps Headquarters. Most of the letter writers questioned the justice of prosecuting young men for doing the killing they had been trained and sent to do. The protestors also stressed the emotional pressures of counterguerrilla operations as mitigating circumstances for the Marines' offense. Replying to these letters, Headquarters spokes­men carefully avoided comment on the facts of the Son Thang case, but they declared as a general principle:

There is no denying that the ordeal of combat puts ex­treme pressures on the Marines fighting in Vietnam. However, the Marine Corps is fighting in Vietnam in the name of a nation which requires certain standards of civi­lized conduct to be maintained even under the trying cir­cumstances of combat. Those standards do not permit the intentional killing of persons, such as civilians or prisoners of war, who are not actually participating in combat. When there is an allegation that such an event has occurred ap­propriate action must be taken in accordance with the taw.10

The Article 32 investigation began on 12 March and continued until the 23d. As a result of it, Major Gener­al Widdecke, who had replaced the injured Wheeler as 1st Marine Division commander, on 15 May referred four of the patrol members to trial by general court-martial, Lance Corporal Herrod and Private Schwartz on charges of premeditated murder and PFCs Green and Boyd on charges of unpremeditated murder. The division dropped charges against Kritchen, who had agreed to testify for the prosecution. After a separate investigation, General Widdecke imposed nonjudicial punishment on Lieutenant Ambort for making a false official report. Punishment consisted of a letter of reprimand and the forfeiture of $250 pay for each of two months.

Trials of the four murder defendants began in June with that of Schwartz, and ended on 30 August with the verdict on Herrod. Herrod and Boyd retained civilian attorneys, while Schwartz and Green were represented by military defense counsel. Legal maneu­vers by the defense in the Federal courts, inquiries by the defendants' Congressmen, and charges of brig bru­tality toward Green—the only black among the accused—complicated the proceedings. The results of the trials were mixed. Military courts found Schwartz guilty on 12 of 16 counts of premeditated murder and Green guilty on 15 of 16 counts of unpremeditated murder. Schwartz and Green received sentences respec­tively of life and five years at hard labor;** in addition, both were sentenced to forfeiture of all pay and al­lowances and dishonorable discharge. Boyd was tried, at his own request, before a military judge sitting alone and won acquittal on all charges. In the final Son Thang (4) trial, a full military court acquitted Her­rod after a vigorous defense conducted by two state senators from Oklahoma, Herrod's home state. On 15 December 1970, Major General Widdecke reduced the prison terms of Schwartz and Green, both of whom had been moved from Da Nang to the Camp Pendle-ton brig, to one year each but let stand the rest of their sentences. The varied results of the trials brought some press and Congressional protest and even ridicule, but the Marine Corps had allowed the legal system to work without manipulation; and it had been willing to ac­knowledge and attempt to punish wrongdoing by its own men.11

Most civilian casualties resulted from errors of judge­ment in combat or misdirected fire, not deliberate murderous intent. In the short, sharp firefights in or

* Such an investigation is required whenever preliminary evalua­tion of facts pertaining to a crime or charge indicates that a general courtmartial may be recommended. During the pretrial investiga­tion, the accused may be represented by counsel and may present witnesses or cross-examine those called by the convening authority. The hearings are transcribed, and the investigating officer makes recommendations to the convening commander as to disposition of the case, in this instance to the Commanding Officer, 1st Bat­talion, 7th Marines. If a general courrmartial is recommended, the findings go for review and approval to the higher commander with general courtmartial convening authority, in this case to the Com­manding General, 1st Marine Division. lstMarDivOP5800.1B.dtd 5Feb70, Tab B-6, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb70, prescribes in detail procedures for the Article 32 investigation, as well as other aspects of division legal procedures. ** The maximum penalty for premeditated murder under UCMJ was death, but General Widdecke had directed thai the case be tried as noncapital, which made the maximum punishment life im­prisonment.