We had a special phone that was a dedicated phone from him to CGFMPPac and that phone rang quite regularly .... He included CGFMFPac in everything and treated him as a component commander, although of course he wasn't .... The relationship between CinCPac and CGFMFPac and CinCPac staff and CGPMFPac staff was very, very cordial.5

Besides maintaining contact with higher headquart�ers through FMFPac, III MAF regularly sent represen�tatives to the CinCPac movement planning conferences and other meetings concerned with redeployment. Ill MAF passed redeployment directives to subordinate commands; coordinated plans for unit reliefs, stand downs, and embarkations; and dealt with MACV, the other Services within Vietnam, and the South Viet�namese on such matters as equipment turnovers and real estate transfers. The 1st Marine Division, 1st MAW, and FLC had primary responsibility for preparing men and equipment for embarkation and moving them to piers and airports on schedule. For this purpose, the 1st Marine Division in January 1970 activated a Logis�tic Operations Center under the G-4. The Division Embarkation Officer and his staff continually inspect�ed redeploying units and assisted subordinate units in making inventories and other preparations.6

The plans for redeployment increments were drafted in terms of units to be redeployed or deactivated and total numbers of troops to be deducted from the authorized strength of each Service in Vietnam. To car�ry out the Marine Corps portion of each plan, HQMC and FMFPac had to determine which individual Ma�rines to redeploy to bring III MAF down to the re�quired size and assign the men thus selected to departing units. In deciding who should redeploy and who should stay, the Marine commanders had to strike a balance between contradictory military require�ments. Lieutenant General Jones explained:

It was necessary to consider a whole host of complex pro�blems such as the retention of needed skills in WestPac, read�iness of remaining as well as redeploying units, the need for key personnel in each redeploying unit, tour equity for the individual Marine. Many of these considerations are coun�terproductive and finding the right combination has been a real experience in every sense of the word.7

In practice, tour equity overshadowed all other con�siderations. Those Marines with the fewest months re�maining in their current 12-month tours normally were selected for each redeployment. In Keystone Bluejay, men who had served nine months or more of their tours were considered eligible; in Keystones Robin Al�pha and Robin Charlie, Marines whose tours were scheduled to end on or before a particular month were earmarked for redeployment. Eligible Marines with skills urgently needed by remaining III MAF units were kept in Vietnam in each redeployment, while a few noneligibles needed to guard and maintain equip�ment in transit were sent home early. This was not al�ways the benefit it seemed to be, as such assignments frequently entailed long, dull voyages on amphibious ships packed with miscellaneous vehicles and stores.

Since III MAF units always included Marines with a mixture of end-of-tour dates, no redeploying unit could simply leave with its existing personnel. Instead, in a process nicknamed the "mixmaster," each unit selected for redeployment to Hawaii or the continen�tal United States transferred its noneligible Marines to organizations staying in Vietnam and at the same time filled its ranks with eligible Marines from other commands. As a result, few units returned to the Unit�ed States composed of Marines who had served with the unit in Vietnam. Units bound for Okinawa and Japan underwent much less "mixmastering." In order to maintain combat readiness, these commands em�barked with their existing personnel, including Ma�rines otherwise eligible for redeployment, who simply completed their Western Pacific tours at their new stations.8

To implement these complex manpower reshuffles, HQMC delegated broad transfer and reassignment authority to FMFPac. The FMFPac staff broke down each redeployment into numbers of Marines of each rank, grade, and skill who were to be redeployed from the 1st MAW, 1st Marine Division, and Force Logistic Command, either by transfer to redeploying organi�zations or by normal rotation. A liaison team from FMFPac, located at III MAF Headquarters, briefed the commands on these strength reduction requirements and where necessary assisted in their implementation. Each of the major III MAF subordinate commands, through its G-l section, then screened its own person�nel for Marines eligible for redeployment, arranged for the necessary transfers between units, and prepared and issued the thousands of individual orders and transportation requests required- FMFPac, besides overseeing this "mixmaster," periodically halted or reduced the flow of replacements to III MAF to as�sure compliance with post-redeployment manpower ceilings. FMFPac also directed special transfers of III MAF personnel to units on Okinawa and in Japan, both to reduce numbers in Vietnam and to rebuild other Western Pacific commands.8