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Page 314(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page


Sons. Three teams used the hill as a CP, radio relay station, and resting place. Remaining for 13 days, they fanned out on foot on assigned patrol missions. One team usually rested at the patrol base, constituting a reaction force while the other two were deployed. From then on, the battalion maintained a patrol base con­tinuously in the Que Sons and periodically established bases on Charlie Ridge and in Elephant Valley. When weather often restricted helicopter operations, teams working out of patrol bases, once inserted, could re­main longer in the field and reinforce each other in the event of a major contact. The teams also gained an advantage of surprise, since no helicopter activi­ties, except for those involved in setting up the patrol base, signalled the reconnaissance Marines' entry into their operating areas.58

Under Lieutenant Colonel Trainer's guidance the battalion continued this pattern of operation later in 1970 and during the first months of 1971. Its patrol base on Charlie Ridge became part of Operation Upshur Stream late in January. On both Charlie Ridge and in the Que Sons, infantry platoons took over the protection of reconnaissance patrol bases, while recon­naissance teams did most of the patrolling during Upshur Stream and Imperial Lake. Lieutenant Colonel Trainor observed that his reconnaissance teams usual­ly had the "advantage of the initiative." He later wrote that during his command tenure "no team was ever ambushed; on the contrary, it was the teams that did the ambushing."59

During late 1970 and early 1971, reconnaissance sightings of enemy troops and reconnaissance-inflicted enemy casualties grew steadily fewer. This decline reflected both reduced Marine reconnaissance activi­ty and the shift of most patrolling to areas closer to Da Nang. The low level of action also indicated an apparent decline in enemy strength and aggressive­ness. In December 1970, the 1st Reconnaissance Bat­talion sighted only 162 NVA and VC during 56 patrols, called 10 artillery fire missions and three air strikes, killed 23 enemy, and captured nine weapons. In the same month, the battalion lost three Marines wounded in action and seven nonbattle casualties. Action con­tinued at this rate during January and February 1971.60

On 14 March 1971, the battalion began its Keystone Robin Charlie redeployment. On that day, the Head­quarters and Service Company and Company B ceased operations. After a farewell ceremony on the 19th, these units left Da Nang on the 24th with the battal­ion colors, bound for Camp Pendleton. Company A of the battalion, the reconnaissance element of the 3d MAB, continued operations until 28 April, when it extracted its last two deployed teams from Sherwood Forest, west of Da Nang, and from Elephant Valley. On 1 May, the company stood down; by the 13th, the last reconnaissance Marines had left Vietnam.61



Page 314(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page



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