attained or even expected by the division.* The favora�ble ratio of air support to ground troops continued throughout the 1970-1971 redeployments, as III MAF kept infantry and helicopter withdrawals in close balance.
Major General Thrash took full advantage of the new sufficiency of helicopters. He announced as his policy that "any [helicopter] mission requested by the division that is within our capability will be launched."4 Following many of the recommendations of the "'Youngdale Board, Thrash tried to improve the coordination of helicopter and ground operations and to increase mutual understanding by air and ground Marines of each other's techniques and problems. Also, within the limits of existing aviation organization and doctrine, he began experimenting with the delegation of helicopter mission assignments, and, in some cases, command and control, to ground unit headquarters.
During 1970-1971, the 1st MAW assistant wing com�mander routinely attended the 1st Marine Division commanders' briefing four days a week to note and report to the wing any ground complaints about air operations and any division plans which would affect air activities. To improve day-to-day coordination of helicopter and infantry operations, the wing stationed a colonel/assistant G-3 at the DASC located with the 1st Division. This officer, in consultation with the di�vision air officer, had the authority to divert or assign secondary missions to any helicopters flying in sup�port of the division; if necessary he could request ad�ditional helicopters directly from the wing TADC. All 1st MAW helicopters on missions for the division on a particular day were treated as a single "division block," which the DASC could employ. In contrast to the previous practice of having only junior aviation officers regularly in the DASC, placing a colonel there expedited air-ground consultation on problems as they arose. In the words of Major General Armstrong, "You get a colonel up ... at the division, and you can talk to people."5**
To enhance understanding by air and ground Ma�rines of each other's methods and problems, wing and division units began orientation visits. Lieutenants from the division periodically spent days with the CH-46 squadrons of MAG-16. According to Colonel Haywood R. Smith, who commanded the helicopter group from March to October 1970, the infantry officers "would fly with us, see . . . their area from the air. See what we did and how we did it and why we did it. And it helped."6 Both fixed-wing and helicopter aviators, in turn, visited infantry regiments and battalions. They toured positions, attended brief�ings on operations, and watched artillerymen and in�fantrymen employ their weapons. The jet pilots, particularly, found this experience "highly interesting to most of the officers, who had not been to Basic School and had a chance to fire . . . these . . . weapons."7*** Many pilots also had lengthy, informal, and frank discussions with ground commanders about air support problems. Among the problems discussed was medical evacuation after dark. "Support at night was difficult to obtain, except for emergencies," recalled Lieutenant Colonel James W. Rider who flew Cobras for HML-367, "This was true even on nights with good visibility and bright illumination. I called in a priority medevac about 1800 one evening, before sunset, and was told that the night crews had assumed
* The wing is the aviation element which is task-organized to sup�port a Marine division. It's composition is variable, however each wing must be capable of performing the six functions of Marine aviation. A typical wing might include two fixed-wing Marine Air Groups (MAGs) and one helicopter MAG. The MAGs are also task-organized. In 1970, a helicopter MAG supporting a division could have included one arrack squadron (HMA) of 24 AH-1Gs, three medium helicopter squadrons (HMMs) each composed of 12 CH-46Ds, a heavy squadron (HMH) of 24 CH-53Ds, and a light squadron (HML) of 24 UH-lEs. The foregoing helicopter Structure is notional; its precise composition would be determined by the actual size of the ground unit, the mission assigned, and a host of other subjective considerations associated with mission accom�plishment **Helicopter missions were divided into preplanned and on-call categories. Ground units requested preplanned helicopter support a day in advance through the 1st Marine Division Air Officer, who, in turn, submitted requests to 1st MAW G-3. The wing then con�solidated requests from the division and other XXIV Corps units and prepared a daily fragmentary order, a copy of which went to the DASC. The DASC then monitored the missions, controlling the helicopters as they entered division airspace and passing them on to the terminal controllers with the ground units- On any given day, more preplanned missions were ordered than there were helicopters to carry then out. As a helicopter finished its first as�signed mission, if another mission remained uncovered and the helicopter had not exceeded its flight hours for the day, the DASC could give it a second mission. On-call missions, not listed on the frag, came from the regiments and the division air office to the DASC, which then could divert already assigned helicopters, as�sign the additional mission as a secondary mission, or call on the TADC to launch additional aircraft. Helicopters fragged to the di�vision for preplanned or on-call additional missions all became pare of the "division block," when so assigned. McNamara Intvw.
***Due to a shortage of pilots, most junior Marine aviators at this time did not attend the Basic School, but instead went directly from the officer candidate programs to flight instruction.
