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Page 271(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page


tremely intelligent"2 he devoted much of his first six months in command to improving the working rela­tionship between the wing and the Marine divisions. Brigadier General Dulacki, then III MAF Chief of Staff, recalled:

I've never seen a commander operate the way he docs, from the standpoint of getting the aviation message across. General Thrash made it a point to visit all the battalions, all the regiments. If they have a problem, he'll go out and talk to them .... He has visited the Army units; his group commanders have; his squadron commanders have. And . . . they have just knocked themselves out to support the ground forces in every way they can .... This attitude has permeated his entire command . ...3

By the end of 1969, Thrash's campaign to improve air-ground teamwork appeared to be succeeding. Major General George S. Bowman, Jr., a Marine serving as Deputy Commanding General, XXIV Corps, informed General McCutcheon late in De­cember:

Here in III MAF we have a very fine relationship between our Ground and Air. . . . [Thrash] spends a good deal of time to make it so. He is bending every effort to use more of the air capability in support of the ground effort. And I mean this from a planning point of view, and not just hav­ing it available should someone call up . ..4

General Thrash also oversaw a steady diminution of 1st MAW strength. During January and February 1970, HMH-361, VMFA-542, and VMFA-223 were transferred from Vietnam to MCAS, Santa Ana and MCAS, El Toro. MAG-12, commanded by Colonel James R. Weaver, with its headquarters and support squadrons and VMA-211, was transferred to MCAS, Iwakuni. These changes were accomplished as pan of Keystone BlueJay. The withdrawals permitted the transfer of VMO-2 from Marble Mountain to Da Nang, a field more suitable for its operations, and once there the observation squadron became part of MAG-11. The removal of the OV-10As and the redeployment of HMH-361 made room at Marble Mountain for HMMs -161 and -262, which now moved there from Phu Bai, completing the concentration of all the wing's helicopters at one base. At Chu Lai, VMA-311, the last Marine A-4E squadron in Vietnam, was transferred from MAG-12 to MAG-13. By the end of March, the 1st MAW had been reduced to two fixed-wing and one helicopter group, a total of 174 planes and 212 helicopters.5

The wing, more than other III MAF elements, felt the disruptive impact of repeated changes in plans for the Keystone Robin Alpha redeployment.* Initially, the Marines planned to remove six squadrons in this withdrawal: VMCJ-1, VMA (AW)-242, VMFAs -122 and -314, and HMMs -161 and -262. They also intended to redeploy MAG-13, with its headquarters and sup­port elements, and close Chu Lai Airbase.

These plans were quickly changed. MACV and XXIV Corps forced retention of VMFA-314 and HMM-262 to assure adequate jet and helicopter sup­port for I Corps; they also objected to the proposed withdrawal of VMCJ-1. Ill MAF particularly wanted to remove the latter squadron. Large in manpower, VMCJ-1 had continual difficulty keeping its compli­cated equipment in working order. It flew most of its photographic reconnaissance and electronic counter-measures missions in support of Seventh Air Force and Seventh Fleet operations over Laos and North Viet­nam rather than Marine forces in South Vietnam. Em­phasizing the logistic costs of keeping the squadron in South Vietnam, III MAF finally persuaded MACV to let VMCJ-1 leave.

All these changes in plan occurred in mid-June. In August, with the Keystone Robin Alpha redeployment already under way, including extensive transfer of men and equipment between squadrons, MACV and III MAF decided to put VMFA-314 back in the withdraw­al. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had restricted the num­ber of monthly fighter-attack sorties, so the additional Marine jets were no longer needed in Vietnam. This meant that personnel and material had to be shifted again.8

Eventually, VMCJ-1, VMFAs -122 and -314, VMA (AW)-242, HMM-161, and MAG-13 with its headquarters and support squadrons left Vietnam in Keystone Robin Alpha. VMFA-115 and VMA-311 moved to Da Nang and joined MAG-11. In October, the last Marine aviation elements left Chu Lai, and control of that airfield passed to the U.S. Army. By 1 November, all of the remaining wing units, with the exception of two air support radar teams (ASRTs) deployed in northern I Corps, had been drawn into the Da Nang area. The wing, now under Major Gener­al Alan J. Armstrong, who had relieved Thrash on 2 July, consisted of two aircraft groups: MAG-11 under Colonel Albert C. Pommerenk, and MAG-16 com­manded by Colonel Lewis C. Street III. Pommerenk's * For a full account of the planning for this and other redeploy­ment phases and for the formation of the 3d MAB, see Chapter 3.



Page 271(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page



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