served the enemy in other ways: "Unfortunately, these attacks did achieve one success � the stateside media blew such incidents completely out of proportion and drew erroneous conclusions as to their meaning and effect."9
The Marine MPs had to contend with internal South Vietnamese domestic terrorism, as well as the more familiar enemy violence. ARVN soldiers occasionally threw grenades at national policemen and Popular Forces fired small arms to break up fights between rival non-Communist political groups. During October, the battalion conducted a series of psychological opera�tions in the supposedly pacified hamlets on the north and west borders of the Da Nang Airbase, "in an ef�fort to gain popular support to stem the indiscriminate firing of small arms . . . directed towards the perimeter bunkers and aircraft." In spite of this effort, aircraft landing and taking off continued to be subjected to sporadic fire, some of which appeared to be from Popular Forces compounds.10
During the first months of 1971, as III MAF was replaced by 3d MAB, the 1st Military Police Battalion, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Colia, who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Donahoo the previous November, continued to protect the Da Nang Vital Area. On 7 May, with the cessation of all Marine combat, the battalion ended small-unit oper�ations and turned defense of the airfield over to the 104th Regional Force Battalion and the 796th Region�al Force Company. The MP battalion retained its AFP and brig duties throughout the rest of May, as well as the guard of the remaining 3d MAB cantonments. On 1 June, a detachment of Marines from the U.S. Embassy Security Guard in Saigon relieved the MPs protecting the Da Nang consulate, and five days later the battalion was released from all Armed Forces Police tasks. The battalion stood down on 7 June. By the 24th, all elements had departed for Camp Pendleton, where the battalion was deactivated. As the last Marines left, the commander of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade took over as defense coordinator for U.S. installations in the DVA.*11
Base Defense
Throughout Quang Nam, major Marine bases were potentially lucrative targets for ground patrols and attacks by fire. Sprawling complexes such as LZ Baldy, FSB Ross, Hill 55, and An Hoa Combat Base con�tained headquarters, supply dumps, artillery batter�ies, and communications and support units of many kinds. Some bases housed ARVN and U.S. Army as well as Marine commands. By 1970-1971, the Marines had perfected their system for defending these bases, primarily using manpower from tenant units, while tying down a minimum of infantry units to static defensive missions.
Typical of the Marine base defense system in its most highly developed form was the 5th Marines' plan for protecting An Hoa Combat Base.12 Until American withdrawal from An Hoa in midsummer 1970, this complex contained the 5th Marines' regimental com�mand post and the rear elements of the regiment's 2d and 3d Battalions. The roughly triangular-shaped installation, just across the Thu Bon River from the Arizona Territory and within easy reach of enemy in�fantry and rocket attacks, also contained Headquart�ers Battery, Battery E, and the Mortar Battery of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines; the 3d 175mm Gun Battery; a platoon of the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery; a tank platoon; en�gineer and motor transport companies; and detach�ments from Force Logistic Command and MAG-16. The base included a small airfield, and two helicop�ter landing zones. A continuous belt of barbed wire surrounded An Hoa, backed by fortified two- or three-man fighting positions, and several firing positions for tanks; five watchtowers overlooked the surrounding terrain.
During spring and early summer 1970, the 5th Ma�rines commander. Colonel Ralph F. Estey, as installa�tion coordinator, was in charge of the defense of An Hoa. Estey exercised this authority through his execu�tive officer, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kephart, who performed the additional duty of base defense commander (BDC). The base was divided into six sec�tors, lettered A through F, each encompassing a sec�tion of the perimeter and the units within it. The 5th Marines designated a commander for each sector, nor�mally the commander or executive officer of one of the tenant units** who was responsible for manning and maintaining the perimeter defenses and watch-
* The commander of the 23d Infantry Division had die ultimate responsibility for DVA security, but he delegated the actual coor�dination of defense efforts to the 196th Brigade.
** In April 1970, the sector commanders were: Sector A�Executive Officer, 3/5 (Rear); Sector B�CO, Headquarters Company, 5th Ma�rines; Sector C, Executive Officer, 2/11; Sector D�CO, Base Aug�mentation Company; Sector E�CO, 3d 175mm Gun Battery: Sector F�Executive Officer. 2/5 (Rear).
