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Page 251(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800401

Marine Cpl Gavin R. Lebus, left, holds the leash on his sentry dog 'Max' taut while Sgt Ted]. Ryan, Jr., muzzles his dog 'Caesar' before boarding a Marine CH-53 helicop­ter. The men and dogs are from the Sentry Dog Platoon, 3d Military Police Battalion.

Da Nang. The 1st MP Battalion temporarily doubled its guard force at the consulate, but no attack took place. Communist harassment of the DVA declined in the last months of 1970, partly as a result of severe floods, but gradually increased again in early 1971.

Viet Cong terrorism sometimes took unusual forms. During March 1971, for instance, the MP battalion received reports of 'female VC operating in Da Nang in the role of prostitutes with the intention of spread­ing VD to American and Korean officials. These VC were also reported to have been carrying small weapons with the intention of assassinating clients.' These ladies of the evening, if in fact they existed, claimed no known victims, but other young female Viet Cong were active in Da Nang. The MPs helped to break up a cell of 15- to 18-year-old VC girls who had been blowing up allied military vehicles with bombs made from soda cans filled with plastic ex­plosive.7

Rockets attacks were the greatest Communist threat to the DVA, but their effect during 1970 and 1971 was more political and psychological than military. The III MAF Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki, observed:

They sure didn't inflict much damage on us .... I think they were pretty damn poor when you consider what they could have done. Imagine the number of ammunition dumps, the number of fuel depots and what-have-you we had scattered all over .... If you had given me a couple of Marine squads I could have raised holy hell ... by just planting a rocket or a mortar in the right place at the right time . . . .• Looking back at the effects of enemy rocket attacks, Dulacki conceded that while of neglible importance militarily in most instances, rocket attacks on Da Nang



Page 251(Vietnamization & Redeployment)previous pagenext page



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