called in a helicopter to evacuate eight RFs and one Marine wounded in the attack.

As the helicopter, a CH-46D from HMM-262 flown by First Lieutenant Steven A. Kux, settled down near the railroad tracks, the Viet Cong set off a second mine. The explosion shattered the helicopter, killing one Marine and wounding seven. Lieutenant Kux, painfully wounded in the face, helped pull survivors out of his wrecked aircraft. Then, using a Company I radio, he called in another medical evacuation flight and directed air strikes on suspected enemy positions and escape routes. The air strikes and a reaction force of Marines and RFs drove off the enemy. The Region�al Force soldiers later found and removed the third mine planted on the tracks.78

During the first 10 days of April, the tempo of ac�tion gradually declined. The enemy launched more mortar, rocket, and occasional ground attacks on bridges, refugee villages, and RF and PF compounds-On 5 April, they fired seven rockets into Da Nang, and on the 8th and 9th they hit Hill 55 with eight rockets. They fired five or six more rockets into Da Nang on the 9th. None of the rocket attacks inflicted significant damage, and after the last bombardment of Da Nang the incidence of all forms of enemy ac�tion declined sharply.79

It was clear, nevertheless, that the K-850 Campaign was far from over and that it had features different from those of earlier such offensives. Throughout April, frequent contact between allied patrols and ene�my groups indicated that most NVA and VC main force formations were remaining in the lowlands and being resupplied there, rather than pulling back into the mountains. Further, allied intelligence agencies be�lieved that an element of Front 4 Headquarters now was operating in the populated areas. Most important, the North Vietnamese 58th Regiment had reappeared on the battlefield after a long absence and was con�tinuing offensive operations around An Hoa and Due Due. All signs, in short, pointed toward further at�tacks in the coming weeks.80

The enemy, it seemed, had gained little in the first phase of the K-850 Campaign. They had overrun no major U.S. or South Vietnamese positions and had suffered much heavier losses in men and material than had the allies. Ill MAF conceded, nevertheless, that the enemy offensive was at least a limited political and psychological success, concluding:

, . . although casualties and damage inflicted during this phase of the K-850 Campaign were negligible in proportion to the ordnance and lives expended by the enemy, he may have succeeded psychologically. The Communists demon�strated again to the Vietnamese populace that they can and will carry out attacks despite the best efforts of the allied forces. Combined with the reduction in U.S. forces, this demonstration could have a detrimental effect on the ARVN, the Territorial Forces, and the civilian population."'