have been wholly or partially vacated by withdrawing Marine units. Decisions on deployment of their bat­talions in the field would await further study of the tactical situation. The 23d Division would definitely not occupy LZ Baldy or Firebases Ross and Ryder, which therefore would either be turned over to the ARVN or destroyed. Army and Marine representatives agreed on the desirability of early direct consultation between the 1st Marine Division and the 196th Brigade to work out the many details of the transfer of facili­ties and defense responsibilities. The III MAP G-3, Colonel Charles H. Ludden, who was present at the conference, promptly authorized such contacts by the 1st Marine Division.

Besides preparing to move the 196th Brigade into Quang Nam, XXIV Corps, assisted by III MAF, tried to persuade the 2d ROKMC Brigade to expand its TAOI permanently to include the eastern Que Sons, where the Koreans had previously conducted occasion­al operations. The Korean commander. Brigadier General Lee Dong Yong, encouraged by General Robertson in "Marine to Marine" consultations, ini­tially responded favorably to this suggestion. Lee's Korean superiors in Saigon, however, were more cau­tious. Under their instructions Lee eventually agreed to only a modest enlargement of his territory in the lowlands, although his troops continued to make brief forays into the eastern Que Sons.5

With the identity of the relieving force and the general schedule for its arrival settled, Major General Widdecke on 4 February proposed a detailed plan to III MAF for the first stage of redeployment plans. The objective was to keep up continuous operations throughout the division TAOI, even as troop strength diminished. Under Widdecke's proposal, the rear­rangement of forces was to begin on 13 February, when the 5th Marines would extract its 3d Battalion from Operation Imperial Lake and move it to Hill 34 to pre­pare for departure. The 11th Marines, at the same time, would begin withdrawing its 2d Battalion, the 5th Ma­rines' direct support artillery unit, from combat. From 13 February to 3 March, the 5th Marines was to de­fend Baldy and continue Imperial Lake with its 2d Bat­talion, supported by batteries from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which would occupy firebases in the Que Sons. The 5th Marines' regimental headquarters and 2d Battalion were to stand down on or about 3 March. Another infantry unit, to be determined later, would then replace the 2d Battalion in Imperial Lake. On 8 February, after III MAF approved this plan, the di­vision issued orders for its execution.6

A week after the division issued this first redeploy­ment order, on 17 February, General Abrams con­firmed long-standing Marine expectations that withdrawal of the 3d MAB would follow hard on the heels of its formation. On the 17th, the MACV com­mander directed his subordinate commands to fur­nish detailed troop lists for a projected withdrawal of 29, 000 men, to be carried out between 1 May and 30 June. This redeployment would be necessary to bring American strength in Vietnam down from the 284, 000 men who would be left after completion of Keytsone Robin Charlie to 255, 000, the ceiling established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period after 1July 1971. Abrams set the Marine share of this redeployment at 12, 700 men, in effect the entire 3d MAB- Marine plans for the sixth withdrawal increment, therefore, would merge with those for the seventh increment and for Army assumption of the III MAF TAOI.7

On 18 February, the Americal Division, in response to orders from XXIV Corps, issued its concept of oper­ations for taking over Quang Nam. Under it, the 196th Brigade, consisting of four infantry battalions, rein­forced by an armored cavalry squadron and an air cavalry troop, would start its redeployment northward on 13 April. A battalion each of 105mm and 155mm howitzers and two helicopter companies were to ac­company the brigade. On the 13th, one of the Army infantry battalions, with supporting artillery, would begin operations at Hill 510 in the Que Sons. Ten days later, rear elements of the infantry battalions, artillery and support units, and the brigade headquarters were to occupy the cantonments of the 1st and 11th Ma­rines, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, and other Ma­rine organizations on Division Ridge. The helicopter companies and the air cavalry troop would establish themselves at Marble Mountain. Combat elements of the other three infantry battalions and the armored cavalry squadron were to enter Quang Nam on or about 1 May. The cavalry was to deploy in the Arizo­na Territory northwest of An Hoa. One of the infan­try battalions would be located on Charlie Ridge, while the other two began operations deep in the moun­tains west and northwest of Da Nang.8

The 196th Brigade's tactical plans departed drasti­cally from the Marines' defense system, with its elaborate network of permanent base camps, firebases, and observation posts and its emphasis on saturation patrolling of the Rocket Belt and the populated lowlands. Indeed, the Army planners showed little in­terest in the Marines' system and appeared to doubt its effectiveness. According to Lieutenant General