were trained aerial observers, were on board command and control Hueys during daylight hours.
During Phase Three, which was to last from 7 to 9 March, the ARVN troops would sweep their areas of operation, thoroughly wrecking the trail system and supply caches. Then, in Phase Four, they were to withdraw eastward into South Vietnam, either directly down Route 9 or southeastward through the enemy's base areas in the Da Krong and A Shau Valleys. The choice of withdrawal route would depend on circumstances at that time. Whichever route was chosen, the operation would end on or about 6 April.
Ill MAF took no part in the planning for Lam Son 719 and received no information about it until a few days before D-Day. Between 25 and 30 January, Lieutenant General Sutherland personally briefed Lieutenant General Robertson on the impending offensive and outlined III MAF's part in it. Remembering the meeting years later, Robertson said that Sutherland 'apologized for not briefing me during the early planning phase, but was not to tell anyone, other than his key staff officers, about the operation.'5 Sutherland directed Robertson to furnish Marine air support, both fixed-wing and helicopter, and to increase Marine patrols along Route 1 in Quang Nam, particularly where the highway, important for supply of the operation, crossed Hai Van Pass. Later, on 6 February, as transport difficulties hindered the offensive, Sutherland requested and received a reinforced Marine truck company to help move supplies from Dong Ha to the logistic support areas at FSB Vandegrift and at Khe Sanh.6
Phase One of Lam Son 719 began on schedule.7 On 29 January, Lieutenant General Lam established his I Corps forward command post at Dong Ha and General Sutherland set up XXIV Corps Forward Headquarters at Quang Tri. The following day, in what the Americans called Operation Dewey Canyon II, elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) advanced from FSB Vandegrift along Route 9 toward Khe Sanh and the Laotian border. The U.S. troops met only light, scattered resistance. Behind the combat units, U.S. Army engineers rebuilt bridges and culverts on Route 9 and prepared the long unused highway for truck traffic. Artillery and support units moved into Khe Sanh and began reestablishing an airstrip capable of receiving Air Force C-130 transports. The ARVN 1st Armored Brigade, 1st Airborne Division, and 1st Infantry Division moved up under cover of the American advance and concentrated around Khe Sanh for the move into Laos while U.S. helicopters and trucks brought in fuel, ammunition, and supplies.
Although the objectives of the operation in Laos were
concealed for as long as possible, leaks of information did occur. South
Vietnamese Major General
Aerial view of Route 9 near Khe Sanh.
This narrow road meandered through the difficult mountain passages and provided
excellent cover and concealment for enemy ambushes. Throughout the 1968 siege
aerial resupply was the only means of reprovision.
Courtesy of Capt Chalmers R. Hood, Jr., USMC
