In Washington during the autumn, the Marine Corps came under pressure in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep the 3d MAB in Vietnam longer than origi�nally planned. The question of the length of the brigade's stay in the country arose in connection with plans for the Transitional Support Force (TSF), which would remain in Vietnam after most U.S. troops had withdrawn. This force was to provide combat and com�bat service support to the South Vietnamese until they achieved complete military self-sufficiency, or until the war ended, whichever happened first. The TSF would consist of about 255, 000 U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, including nine Army infantry brigades. As had happened during the planning for Keystone Robin Alpha, the Army reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late October that shortages of men and money might prevent it from furnishing those nine brigades without reducing its forces elsewhere. The Joint Chiefs, in an effort to relieve the Army without reducing the TSF, then suggested to the Serv�ices, and to MACV and CinCPac, substitution of the 3d MAB for one of the Army brigades and its suppor�ting units. This substitution, if made, could keep the Marine brigade in Vietnam until the end of Fiscal Year 1972, 30 June 1972, as much as a year beyond its in�tended departure date of 30 June 1971.

The proposal met strong objections from the Ma�rine Corps, which pointed out that its budgets and manpower planning were based on continuing the previously established rate of redeployment. Keeping the MAB in Vietnam for an extra year would force reduction of other Marine Corps capabilities. Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CinCPac, also objected. He stat�ed that retention of the MAB in Vietnam would de�lay reestablishment of the projected Pacific reserve of two full Marine division-wing teams, one based in Okinawa, Japan, and Hawaii and the other in California.6

General Abrams passed the proposal on to Lieute�nant General Sutherland, the XXIV Corps com�mander. On 9 November, Sutherland urged that the MAB not be included in the Transitional Support Force. While expressing his "complete confidence and professional admiration" for the Marines, he pointed out that communications and command problems would result from retaining a Marine Service compo�nent command that late in the redeployment process and that, if retained, the MAB would require addi�tional Army logistic support. Sutherland also noted that a Marine brigade was larger by about 4, 000 men than a typical Army brigade and included an air as well as a ground element. Keeping the MAB would force additional reductions in the other Service com�ponents to compensate for the Marine aviation per�sonnel.7 In spite of all these objections, the possibility of adding the MAB to the TSF remained open until the last days of 1970, because MACV and CinCPac, while reluctant to have the Marine brigade, would ac�cept it rather than reduce the total strength of the transitional force.8

With the issue of retaining the MAB and the ques�tion of the size of the MAB TAOR still unresolved, General Abrams on 3 November directed III MAF, with the other U.S. Service commands, to submit its list of units to be withdrawn in Increment VI. Of the 60, 000 Americans to be withdrawn in this increment, III MAF, as planned earlier, was to furnish 12, 400, one regimental landing team with aviation and support units.9

The MACV request for a definitive troop list for Increment VI forced III MAF to make an immediate and final decision on the composition of the 3d MAB, since by process of elimination the redeployment troop list would consist of the units not wanted in the brigade. Accordingly, on 5 November, Lieutenant General McCutcheon held a conference of com�manders and staff officers of the wing, division, and Force Logistic Command. He informed the assembl�ed officers that, with the MACV demand for a troop list in hand, "the time had come for a decision on the structure of the MAB." By this time, the III MAF staff had developed seven different possible organizations for the MAB- Most of these included varying reduc�tions of the fixed-wing aviation element, to allow retention of all or a portion of a fourth infantry bat�talion. Two of the alternatives called for an increase in total MAB strength to 13, 600 to make room for both a fixed-wing air group and the additional infantry.10

At the 5 November conference, McCutcheon an�nounced his selection of Alternative Six. As original�ly drafted, this plan increased the brigade to 13, 600 men to permit retention of two Jet squadrons and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. McCutcheon, however, decided to eliminate the jet squadrons and their air group, MAG-11, leaving a MAB of 12, 600 with four full infantry battalions, a military police battalion, and a strong helicopter group, but no fixed-wing aviation except a detachment of OV-lOs. The III MAF com�mander explained that he expected the operating life of the MAB to be short and believed, as he had since