(TAORs). Instead, they received Tactical Areas of In­terest (TAOIs), which normally encompassed about the same terrain as their old TAORs. Only ARVN com­mands now would have TAORs, and they would be responsible for assigning Areas of Operation (AOs) to allied units, usually in Clearing or Border Surveillance Zones.

This meant that in I Corps/MR 1, the TAOR com­mander became Lieutenant General Lam, while XX-IV Corps had a TAOI which included all of me military region. Each subordinate command under XXIV Corps received a TAOI consisting of its former TAOR. Ill MAF's TAOI, for example, continued to be Quang Nam Province. Marine units would defend and patrol more or less where they had defended and patrolled before, but now within AOs granted by Quang Da Special Zone. This change involved more of an alter­ation of terminology and staff procedures than of day-to-day field operations, thus giving expression to the primacy of South Vietnamese responsibility for the conduct of the war. The change also forced ARVN headquarters to assume more of the burden of plan­ning and directing operations.3

Soon after the issuance of the military plans, the South Vietnamese government, on 7 January 1971, is­sued its pacification and development plan for the new year. Breaking with past practice, the government called the document its "Community Defense and Lo­cal Development Plan" for 1971. This change of name was intended to dramatize the government's conten­tion that, since most of the South Vietnamese people now lived under government control, "pacification" had been largely completed and the country now should emphasize development.

Instead of the Eight Objectives of the 1970 plan, the 1971 plan had only three: Self-Defense, Self-Government, and Self-Development. Each title, as in past plans, embraced a number of continuing pro­grams. Self-Defense included efforts to improve vil­lage security, with the goal of having 95 percent of the people living in A or B hamlets by the end of the year. This goal also continued attempts to improve the national police and embraced the Chieu Hoi Program and the Phoenix/Phung Hoang effort, which in 1970 neutralized 2, 437 VCI in Quang Nam, representing an estimated 40 percent of the enemy agents in the province. Self-Government covered training programs for local officials, encouragement of popular self-help organizations, and a campaign to instill in the South Vietnamese people an "increased awareness of the meaning of democracy." Under Self-Development were grouped such programs as land reform, aid to refu­gees and war victims, and activities to improve agricul­ture and fisheries and help villages develop their own economies, all aimed "at committing all the people to the effort of developing the economy and the soci­ety so that progress toward self-sufficiency could be obtained." MACV endorsed the new pacification plan, instructing subordinate U.S. commanders to give "full support" to its implementation.4

Final Plans for Redeployment and the MAB

During the last months of 1970, the staffs of III MAF and its subordinate commands continued to be preoccupied with planning for additional redeploy­ments and for the organization and activation of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. The two problems continued to be closely linked. Removal of all Marines from redeployment Increment V (Keystone Robin Bra­vo) had forced postponement of the activation of the MAB, initially scheduled for early fall. Instead, acti­vation now was to occur after completion of Increment VI (Keystone Robin Charlie), which was to begin on 1 January 1971 and include the 12, 400 Marines origi­nally slated for Robin Bravo. Ill MAF now expected the MAB, which would consist of the Marines remain­ing after Robin Charlie, to begin operations in late April 1971.

Both the organization and the overall mission of me MAB had taken shape by autumn 1970, after almost a year of discussion, although there were still un­resolved problems concerning exact composition. The brigade, with a total strength of about 12, 600 Marines, was to have a ground component built around the 1st Marines and an air element consisting of an as yet un­determined mixture of aircraft types. Ill MAF plan­ners were working on the assumption that the brigade, when activated, would have the general mission of pro­tecting the Da Nang area. They were uncertain, however, how large the MAB TAOR* was to be. XXIV Corps had not yet stated definitely whether Ameri­can or other allied units would be sent to Quang Nam to augment the dwindling Marine forces. The MAF and division staffs, accordingly, had to base their plans for MAB ground operations on the assumption that the brigade might have to defend the entire 1st Ma­rine Division TAOR.5

* The change in terminology from TAOR to TAOI had not yet been made, and until January 1971, Americans continued to talk about TAORs.