CHAPTER 10

Allied Strategic and Redeployment Plans for 1971

Military and Pacification Plans for 1971-Final Plans for Redeployment and the MAB A New Commander for 111 MAP-Military Situation in Quang Nam and Military Region 1, Early 1971

Military and Pacification Plans for 1971

Late in 1970, as U.S. and South Vietnamese staffs prepared their plans for the following year, the Southeast Asian war gave evidence of simultaneous de-escalation and escalation. Within South Vietnam it­self, the level of combat was declining as the allies con­centrated on pacification, the Americans withdrew, and the Communists reverted to guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, the U.S. and ARVN sweep of the ene­my's Cambodian bases, continuing ARVN operations and growing internal war in Cambodia, and increas­ingly heavy American air attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos pointed toward an expanded allied ef­fort to wreck the Communists' cross-border bases, thereby reducing the enemy's ability to reintensify the war in South Vietnam.

The allied Combined Campaign Plan for 1971, promulgated on 31 October 1970 by the South Viet­namese, American, and allied commanders, reflect­ed the changing trends of the war. Generally, the plan restated the allied strategy of the previous year, with increased emphasis on the RVNAF's assuming the tasks hitherto performed by the redeploying Ameri­cans, who would continue and accelerate their with­drawal. Under the plan, the ARVN and allied regular units were to operate primarily against main forces and base areas, and the ARVN in addition were to attack Communist forces in 'authorized areas,' i.e. Cambo­dia and Laos. The plan restated the established mis­sion of the Regional and Popular Forces, People's Self Defense Force, and national police, assigning them to protect populated areas and support pacification.

Allied forces were to measure their progress during the year in terms of nine objectives: participation in the 1971 pacification campaign; improvement of the RVNAF 'to achieve a maximum state of combat ef­fectiveness'; employment of the RVNAF according to its assigned missions and capabilities; the infliction of 'more losses on the enemy than he can replace'; denial to the enemy of the use of base areas and logis­tic systems within South Vietnam and adjacent coun­tries; restoration and protection of roads and railways in South Vietnam; keeping food and other resources out of Communist hands; increasing intelligence and counterintelligence efforts; and neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure 'to the maximum extent possible.''

The XXIV Corps/MR 1 Combined Campaign Plan, promulgated on 29 December 1970, closely followed the national plan. It placed great emphasis on con­tinuing U.S. redeployments and on improvement and modernization of the South Vietnamese forces so that they could 'become self sufficient and capable of as­suming the entire responsibility for the conduct of the war.' The plan called for increased allied efforts to pro­tect the people and control resources, 'particularly at night'; continued training of ARVN, RFs, and PFs; and the provision of 'responsive' support to province chiefs in their struggle to wipe out the VCI. Having experienced considerable success during 1970 in eliminating the VCI in Quang Nam, the plan called for the allies to intensify this effort while anticipating the enemy's increased attempts to reestablish his depleted military and political infrastructure at the hamlet and village level. The local plan also reiterat­ed the assignment of missions to regulars, RFs, and PFs made in the national plan. In a variant on earlier plans, the XXIV Corps/MR 1 plan declared that the Regional Forces were to be employed under direction of the province chiefs in offensive operations against enemy provincial or local units. Only in the 'most compelling cases' were RFs to be given static defense assignments. The 1971 plan also restated the Area Security Concept of the 1970 plan, under which each province was divided into heavily populated and rela­tively peaceful Secure Areas and Consolidation Zones controlled by the province chief, and more thinly populated and enemy-infested Clearing Zones and Border Surveillance Zones under ARVN or allied tac­tical unit commanders.2

The most significant new element in both national and regional military plans was a change in the defi­nition of the role of U.S. units from conducting oper­ations on their own to supporting and assisting South Vietnamese forces. This change was closely related to the Area Security Concept. On 1 January 1971, allied units ceased to have Tactical Areas of Responsibility