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Page 139(The Struggle for Security: Combined Action )previous pagenext page


CHAPTER 8

The Struggle for Security: Combined Action

Combined Action Platoons-deducing the Combined Action force Building on Success: The Combined Unit Pacification Program

Combined Action Platoons

As a military force, the Marines concerned them­selves primarily with the security aspect of pacifica­tion. They devoted most of their activity to keeping enemy military units out of the villages and hamlets and to assisting the GVN in eradicating the VCI. While almost all Marines directly or indirectly took some part in this effort, those involved in the Com­bined Action Program had protecting the villages and hamlets from local guerrillas as their sole mission.

The Combined Action Program originated with the Marines in Vietnam and was unique to them. It had begun in 1965 when III MAF, in trying to secure the heavily populated area around Hue/Phu Bai, disco­vered a potential ally in the then disparaged and neglected Popular Forces. Platoons of these parttime soldiers, under command of the district chiefs, guard­ed particular hamlets and villages. If their deficien­cies in training, weapons, and morale could be overcome, they could relieve regular Marine units of many static defensive tasks and help tear out the local roots of enemy strength.

To work with the PFs, III MAF instituted the com­bined action platoon (CAP), consisting of a 15-man Marine rifle squad paired with a 15- to 30-man PF pla­toon to defend one particular village. Each element of the team strengthened the other. The Marines con­tributed firepower, training, and access to American medical evacuation and artillery and air support. The PFs furnished intimate knowledge of the terrain, the people, and the local VC. In the villages where they were stationed, CAPs won fights against local guerril­las and small main force detachments and drove out or killed the VC political cadres. Then, unlike con­ventional American and ARVN units which swept an area and moved on, the CAPs stayed and furnished the people continual protection against Viet Cong ter­rorism, recruiting, and taxation. As the Marines won the confidence of the villagers, the CAPs became a major source of allied intelligence, and behind the security shield they afforded, the GVN could reestab­lish its authority and undertake social and economic improvements. With proven success, the number of CAPs grew, and during 1966 III MAF extended the program to the Marine TAORs around Da Nang and Chu Lai. To administer the CAPs and to coordinate their activities, III MAF created combined action com­panies (CACOs) and then combined action groups (CAGs).

At the begining of 1970, Marine strength in the Combined Action Program had reached its peak. Four CAGs were in operation: the 1st, under Lieutenant Colonel David F. Seller, in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces; the 2d, under Lieutenant Colonel Don R. Christensen, in Quang Nam; the 3d, under Colonel John B. Michaud, in Thua Thien; and the 4th, under Lieutenant Colonel John J. Keenan, in Quang Tri-*

In January 1970, the four CAGs consisted of a total of 42 Marine officers and 2, 050 enlisted men, with two naval officers and 126 hospital corpsmen. Or­ganized in 20 CACOs and 114 CAPs, these Ameri­cans worked with about 3, 000 RF and PF soldiers. The 2d CAG in Quang Nam, largest of the four, consist­ed of eight CACOs with 36 CAPs and almost 700 Ma­rine and Navy officers and men, while the smallest, the 4th in Quang Tri, had three CACOs and 18 CAPs.1

Until January 1970, III MAF exercised command over the four CAGs through an Assistant Chief of Staff and Director, Combined Action Program. To improve coordination and administration of the program. Lieu­tenant General Nickerson late in 1969 requested per­mission to establish a Combined Action Force (CAF), with its own headquarters under III MAF. Lieutenant General Buse, Commanding General, FMFPac, ap­proved his request on 8 January. Three days later, III MAF formally activated the CAF, to consist of a head­quarters, staffed from the combined action section of the III MAF staff, and the four CAGs with their subor­dinate CACOs and CAPs. The existing III MAF Direc-

* The CAGs underwent relatively few changes of command dur­ing 1970. On 5 February, Lieutenant Colonel Claude M. Daniels took over id CAG from Colonel Michaud, and on 18 February Major Robert D. King relieved Lieutenant Colonel Keenan at 4th CAG. Major King was relieved by Major Willis D. Ledeboer on 27 June. On 1 July, Major George N. Robillard, Jr., rook over 1st CAG. CAF ComdCs, Jan-Sep70.



Page 139(The Struggle for Security: Combined Action )previous pagenext page



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