While Marine forces took only a limited pan in the invasion, officers on the XXIV Corps and III MAF staffs closely scanned the intelligence reports for indications of what effect the opening of this new front would have within their own area of responsibility. Colonel George C. Fox, a member of the III MAF Staff, early in May summed up the staffs thinking in these words:

The question I think that most of us have in I Corps, whether we've stated it openly or whether we haven't, is . . . supposing the enemy isn't willing to take this thing laying down, he can't react in III Corps and he sure can't react in IV Corps, so where docs he have to go? He's got to go to II Corps where he's got nothing or I Corps where he has a lot. So there's a feeling amongst us that we could sec a pickup of activity in 1 Corps, if he wants to do it, and I'm talking particularly of northern I Corps, across the D [MZ] and in through the A Shau Valley . . . .'

Estimates of enemy strength in northern and central I Corps gave the allies cause for concern. By early summer, 19 Communist battalions were reported in Quang Tri Province, 20 in Thua Thien, and 16 in Quang Nam. Many of the units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien had moved in since the beginning of the year and remained in mountain base areas for training, refitting, and stockpiling of supplies. Supported from North Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they retained the ability to launch large-scale attacks.4

True to their pattern, however, the NVA seemed content merely to maintain the threat. While they displayed occasional instances of aggressiveness during

President Richard' M. Nixon prepares to board Marine 1, the Presidential Helicopter from Marine Helicopter Squadron (HMX) 1. The President ordered the accelerated redeployment of U.S. forces from Vietnam simultaneously with the incursion into Cambodia.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A419542