base Ross to reinforce its defenders against a threatened attack. The rest of the battalion, in the final phase of the operation, marched southeast down the ravines toward the valley floor northwest of Ross.105
Up to this point, the enemy had offered little resistance to the Marines other than to boobytrap campsites and trails. One of these early in the operation disabled the battalion's Hoi Chanh guide. As the companies moved down the slopes toward the valley floor, however, the enemy struck at them, concentrating on Captain John C. Williams's Company I. On 11 June, a patrol from the company ran info two NVA in bunkers near Hill 953. The enemy's opening bursts of automatic fire killed the point man and wounded the Marine behind him. Moving to assist the patrol, the company's reaction force also took fire. The Marines worked their way around the flanks of the bunkers, threw grenades, and managed to pull their casualties to safety. Then they called in air strikes and artillery which silenced the bunkers. After the fight, Marines searching the bunkers found one dead NVA with an AK-47.
The following day, as the company moved down the mountain with each of its platoons following a separate ridge line or stream bed, the 1st Platoon twice came under sniper and automatic weapon fire, losing three men wounded. In the second and more severe contact, the enemy poured in automatic and RPG fire from both front and flank of the Marines. In each encounter, the platoon's own fire plus shelling and bombing by the supporting arms forced the enemy to withdraw, but after the second action the platoon shifted to a less sharply contested line of march into the valley106 The commander of another platoon commented: "They're pretty weak at this time. If you move into an area with a battalion or a company intact, they won't fight, but anything less than a company and they feel pretty free and easy about continuing contact."107
As the companies reached the valley floor late in the day on 12 June, Company I's 2d Platoon set up its night perimeter within 50 meters of a company-size enemy base camp occupied at the time by about 50 VC or NVA. The Marines had moved in quietly, and the thick undergrowth prevented either side from immediately discovering the other. Within a few minutes, however, three of the enemy blundered into the Marine position and a fire-fight erupted. The enemy fled and the platoon pursued them while calling for air strikes. Three flights attacked the scattering enemy, but most of them had reached cover before the aircraft arrived, and some of the aircraft by accident almost hit the pursuing Marines.108
On 13 June, the battalion assembled in the Que Son Valley and the operation ended. It had netted nine VC/NVA killed, while capturing four prisoners, 44 weapons, and over two tons of food and medical supplies. The battalion moved back to LZ Baldy and began Category II activities in the region southeast of it. On 22 June, Company I, reinforced with an additional rifle platoon, an engineer team, and a forward air controller, returned to LZ Buzzard to resume search and destroy operations under a plan to keep one company in rotation continually in action in the Que Sons.109
Throughout the first half of 1970, the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, provided most of the artillery support for the 7th Marines. With its headquarters and usually one or two batteries at Baldy, the battalion kept one battery each at Ross and Ryder. Reinforcing the 3d Battalion, Battery K of the 4th Battalion, 13th Marines (redesignated in January Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines) operated from Firebase Ross, and the 1st 8 inch Howitzer Battery had a platoon stationed at Ross and a second at Baldy. Occasionally, the battalion displaced a unit to a temporary firebase, as it did in May in sending two mortar platoons from Baldy to LZ Buzzard. The battalion also regularly rotated its gun batteries between Baldy, Ross, and Ryder.110
Early in May, in order to support the infantry more effectively, the 3d Battalion altered its firing policy. When firing in aid of troops in contact with the enemy, the battalion's batteries, as standard procedure, had used a first volley of white phosporous (WP) shells to register on the target. This practice, 7th Marines infantrymen complained, warned the VC or NVA that shells were on the way and gave them time to escape. The 3d Battalion, therefore, instructed its gunners to begin firing first volleys of high explosive unless specifically asked to use WP by the forward observer. According to the artillery battalion, "the new procedure worked well in practice, and the change was enthusiastically received by the infantry units."111
Like the other regiments, the 7th Marines employed the full range of Marine air support, from jet air strikes to helicopter troop transport, medical evacuation, and resupply. The 2d Battalion, while defending Firebase Ross and the Que Son Valley, called for and received numerous close air support strikes. In June, for example, aircraft of the 1st MAW flew 31 attack missions for the 2d Battalion, dropping over 450, 000 pounds
