was composed of two control teams and four advisory teams and proved deficient for the kind of mission assigned. The mission encompassed all engineering activities in the four corps tactical zones of South Vietnam, including facilities maintenance support for each company as well as backup support in the Special Forces Operational Base. Some of the deficiences were made up by reorganizing the available teams, some by contracting with Eastern Construction Company, Inc., a firm in the Philippines, for certain professional and technical skills. The teams were used as designed and as needed countrywide, with the goal of one in support of each company.
At the peak of engineer activity in the period from the summer of 1968 through the winter of 1971, the engineer of the 5th Special Forces Group was concerned with sixty-nine installations including fifty A detachment camps. The camps often housed more than 1,000 civilian irregulars and their dependents, and had all the attendant problems of communities of such a size. Although very few of these camps were constructed during the period, those that were reflected greater concern for the adequate protection of all the inhabitants. Rehabilitation and improvement projects of the time stressed better protection, water sources in the camps, more adequate dispensaries, and better living conditions in general.
From the latter part of 1969 on, much effort went toward bringing all facilities to a high state of maintenance so that they would require little immediate work when they were turned over to the Vietnamese Army. At the same time the Vietnamese were successfully trained to operate and maintain the installations. The Philippines continued to be the primary source of hard core professional engineering and technical skills absolutely necessary for the construction, operation, and maintenance of relatively sophisticated facilities. Local Vietnamese contractors were used whenever they were available; near the large urban areas it was possible to fill most construction needs efficiently by this means, thereby lessening the demands passed to Free World Military Assistance Forces engineer units.
Engineer functions continued to remain under the staff supervision of the G-4 of the Vietnamese Special Forces high command. Although a Vietnamese Special Forces staff officer was designated to monitor engineer activities during a part of this period, he had no qualified counterparts below the high command level. Most engineer actions were therefore taken unilaterally by U.S. Special Forces after superficial combined planning and co-ordination.
On at least two occasions during this period attempts were
