and guidance. Because Special Forces was a unique organization with many talents and demonstrated capabilities, each commander had somewhat different ideas on how to use it. Regardless of the employment, however, each commander was completely receptive to new tactics and techniques, new plans and programs, and new operational possibilities. Operational requests, personnel requisitions, and. administrative and logistical demands were promptly and carefully attended to and authorized whenever possible. Whatever shortfall in Special Forces operations may have occurred, it never came as a result of lack of support from the head of the Military Assistance Command.

One single statutory action that proved most beneficial to the Special Forces was the approval in September 1963 of an Army regulation which dealt with the administrative, logistical, and financial support for paramilitary forces and provided the means by which such support could be obtained, managed, controlled, and accounted for. Before that date support arrangements were accomplished on an ad hoc basis, leaving no firm, acceptable method for accomplishing these requirements on an approved, departmental, permanent basis. The publication of this regulation for the first time placed Department of the Army support for paramilitary activities on a sound, respectable, businesslike footing.

Support by the U.S. Air Force in the Republic of Vietnam was superb. The tactical air force and airlift command elements performed outstanding feats in support of Special Forces. For example, airlift for the first of the three combat parachute assaults conducted by the Special Forces in South Vietnam consisted of nine C-130 aircraft. These planes were assembled, rigged, operationally prepared, spotted, and ready for take-off within a few hours after the approval of the operation was given. The first aircraft crossed the intended drop zone exactly on the minute prescribed. In October 1966 tactical aircraft, hastily scrambled, provided the firepower to rescue a sizable contingent of Special Forces in the Plei Trap Valley. Without these fighters, the force stood to receive staggering casualties. Tactical aircraft provided instant response to missions generated by the mobile guerrilla forces, including resupply of vital necessities. Airlift command was largely responsible for the movement each month of 17,000,000 pounds of supplies in 500-pound lots to Special Forces camps throughout Vietnam. The armed C-47 gunship was a tremendous help to camps under attack and accounted for the continued existence of camps many miles removed from immediate relief forces or firepower.

The U.S. Navy contributed significantly to the successful opera-