PART TWO

THE MIDDLE YEARS: 1965-1968

CHAPTER IV

The CIDG Program Begins To Mature

In the early years the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program was essentially a defensive effort characterized by the overriding goal of securing control over the indigenous minorities and winning their allegiance so that they would not fall to the Communists. The missions were to control the Viet Cong, either through area development or border surveillance or combinations of the two. The civilian irregulars and the U.S. Special Forces were not hunting the Viet Cong in the beginning. The buildup of conventional U.S. forces in Vietnam changed all that and opened the door to the next stage in the evolution of the Special Forces CIDG program�a stage in which the Special Forces and the irregulars would find themselves cast in a distinctly offensive role. They were to become hunters with the mission of finding and destroying the enemy.

In January 1965, just before the beginning of the massive U.S. commitment of conventional forces to South Vietnam, the U.S. Special Forces counterinsurgency program was defined in a letter from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), to the commanders of all operational A, B. and C detachments:

Definition: The SF Counterinsurgency Program is a phased and combined military-civil counterinsurgency effort designed to accomplish the following objectives: (a) destroy the Viet Cong and create a secure environment; (b) establish firm governmental control over the population; and (c) enlist the population's active and willing support of, and participation in the government's programs.

These objectives are accomplished while executing any one of three possible assigned missions: (1) border surveillance and control, (2) operations against infiltration routes, or (3) operations against VC war zones and bases.

Concept of the Operation: This is essentially a clear, secure, and develop operation. A fundamental point in the counterinsurgency program is that, where possible, the Strike Force personnel should be locally recruited in order to provide an exploitable entry to the populace which, in turn, facilitates military-civil relations.

The letter goes on to state that no population area which is 'uncommitted' or which has been dominated by the Viet Cong can be