but these detachments did not have a sufficient depth to manage supply activities in a theater of operations the size of Vietnam.
With the escalation of U.S. efforts in Vietnam, greater dependence was placed upon the Ryukyu islands as the offshore base to support units in Vietnam. A supply detachment was deployed to Okinawa in August, and in November 1965, the 70th Medical Depot was deployed to augment and expand the operation of the medical depot in Okinawa.
The Surgeon General, handicapped by insufficient strength and control of medical supply, coordinated with CINCPAC to establish a system of automatic shipments of medical materiel to Vietnam. These shipments, initiated in July 1965, were based upon schedules developed to support forces which were deployed from the continental United States to Vietnam. The materiel shipped consisted primarily of medical resupply sets and later, after their development, included optical resupply sets. The automatic supply support system continued for a period of approximately 10 months, with peakloads of resupply occurring from November 1965 through January 1966. This system, although only a temporary measure, was not so successful as anticipated. Delays in shipment from CONUS ports and in off-loading procedures at Vietnam facilities and the splitting of the medical resupply sets into various shipments on board vessels were the major difficulties experienced.
Investigation of Malfunctions in the Medical Supply System
By mid-1965, the Army medical materiel supply system was close to a complete breakdown because of the lack of qualified medical logistics personnel in Vietnam, the shortcomings of the medical resupply system related previously, and the inability of a centralized supply management activity in Hawaii to meet the medical materiel demands in Vietnam. In November 1965, the Vice Chief of Staff directed The Surgeon General to investigate and recommend appropriate measures to resolve these difficulties and end the shortages occurring in Vietnam and other subordinate commands within USARPAC. A representative of The Surgeon General investigated and found that the Inventory Control Point, USARPAC, could not provide pertinent data on the medical supply situation within USARPAC.. Consequently, requisitioning objectives were being computed without the full knowledge of subordinate command conditions, environment, or professional requirements. In fact to insure adequacy of objectives, subordinate commands had to review their records constantly and thus engage in duplication of effort. The investigation revealed that the Inventory Control Point provided little assistance to the subordinate commands or to the surgeons who were responsible for the health of troops in those subordinate commands. The report indicated that the medical commodity group was not large enough