There were 139 Chieu Hoi ralliers and 65 detainees. Among items of equipment captured were 100 crew-served weapons, 491 indi-vidual weapons, and thousands of rounds of ammunition, grenades, and mines. More than 5,000 bunkers and military structures were destroyed. Over 810 tons of rice and nearly 40 tons of other food-stuffs such as salt and dried fish were uncovered. Nearly one-half million pages of assorted documents were taken. American personnel losses were 282 killed and 1,576 wounded, while U.S. materiel losses included the destruction of 3 tanks, 21 armored personnel carriers, 12 trucks, 4 helicopters, 5 howitzers, and 2 quad-.50 machine guns and carriers.

In addition to these losses, the enemy suffered other serious setbacks. He had to take time to regroup, refit, reorganize, and receive replacements. Disruption of the headquarters of the Central Office of South Vietnam caused its forces to withdraw to Cambodia and affected its control over Viet Cong activity. Coupled with the loss of large quantities of important documents and the destruction of many important installations and communication networks, this disruption led to a reversal in planning and control during this period and for some time to come. But probably one of the most far-reaching effects of all upon the enemy was the realization that his bases, even in the outer reaches of War Zone C, were no longer havens.

From a psychological standpoint, the enemy in War Zone C was a more difficult target than that normally encountered in the III Corps area. The reason was that the target was composed primarily of hard-core North Vietnamese and Viet Cong; as a result, the usual Chieu Hoi propaganda appeals based on family hardship and separation were not so effective as they were with guerrilla-type units. Early in the operation, quick reaction was recognized as the key to the successful psychological exploitation of hard-core targets.

Commenting on this aspect of the operation, General Weyand had this to say in his Commander's Evaluation of JUNCTION CITY:

During JUNCTION CITY we dropped 9,768,000 leaflets and made 102 hours of aerial loudspeaker appeals. The major engagements of 20, 21 and 31 March were followed up with a wide variety of "quick-reaction" leaflets. They showed photographs of VC dead and contained surrender appeals to the survivors. A specially designed memorandum addressed to the CG of the 9th VC Div was reproduced and distributed as a leaflet to further exploit our success of 20 March. A newsletter exploiting VC casualties and explaining the role of our forces was distributed throughout the III CTZ.

Our military civic action projects supported the overall PSYOP effort. They added credibility to our central propaganda theme: The Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army destroy; the Government of Vietnam/United