of the junction of those two roads. Viet Cong in small three- to four-man groups could maintain continuous pressure on the roads. Although there were many contacts and some heated fire fights with enemy forces, none of these forces-except in the three battles-was significant. As the 173d Brigade found, it made contact of some type each of the twenty-two days it participated in Phase II, but the contacts were with small groups, never larger than platoon size. By the last week of this phase the enemy became increasingly more difficult to find. But this failure to dig out the enemy should not detract from the success attained by friendly forces as they continued to find and destroy installations and to discover vast amounts of supplies and equipment. All of this tended to nullify the years of labor expended by the enemy in building, digging, and tunneling and in accumulating, hauling, and hoarding supplies.

During Phase II the enemy left nearly 1,900 of his dead on the battlefield, had 19 captured, and lost over 240 weapons. And ap-parently in desperation for a big victory, the 9th Viet Cong Divi-sion had sacrificed its other regiments in futile attempts at the battles of Ap Bau Bang II, Suoi Tre, and Ap Gu.