PART TWO

JUNCTION CITY, 22 FEBRUARY- 14 MAY 1967

CHAPTER VIII

Planning and Preparation

JUNCTION CITY was to be the largest operation of the Vietnam war to date and the second one under control of II Field Force, Vietnam. Its primary mission would be search and destroy to eradicate the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) and Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army installations. Also, various installations such as Special Forces camps and airfields were to be built. Two U.S. divisions, with the commitment of as many as twenty-two U.S. infantry battalions, fourteen artillery battalions, and four South Vietnamese battalions would be involved. JUNCTION CITY would also include the first major combat parachute assault since the Korean War.

Like the Iron Triangle, War Zone C was a major Viet Cong stronghold and had been a sanctuary for insurgents for over twenty years. It was also believed to be the location of headquarters of the Central Office of South Vietnam; however, owing to the remote-ness of the area and the strict secrecy with which the enemy treated the headquarters, few facts were known about COSVN installations and units in the area. Clandestine operations conducted in Sep-tember of 1966 and during Operation ATTLEBORO in November had, however, developed significant intelligence on War Zone C.

In discussing the genesis of Operation JUNCTION CITY, General Seaman, commanding general of II Field Force, Vietnam, stated:

I've got to go back to Operation 'Birmingham' which was con-ducted by the 1st Division in War Zone C, in May of 1966. It was conducted along the Cambodian Border as far north as Lo Go (about 30 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh City) and the plan was to airlift a brigade into the then suspected location of COSVN headquarters. The 1st Division airlifted one battalion to the area, intending to get an entire brigade there within the day; but, unfortunately, the weather closed in and the rainy sea-son started a couple of weeks earlier than anticipated. So, the decision was made by the division commander, MG DePuy, to withdraw that one bat-talion, feeling that he could not reinforce it if they got into any difficulty.

Following Operation 'Birmingham,' General Westmoreland said he wanted me to plan an operation in War Zone C to start as soon as possible after the Christmas and New Year's stand-downs of 1966-1967. He said, in effect, 'to think big.' This operation was to start about the 8th of January