PART ONE
CEDAR FALLS, 8-26 January 1967
CHAPTER I
Background and Planning
Shortly after the completion of
Operation BIRMINGHAM in May 1966, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander,
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, directed Lieutenant General Jonathan
O. Seaman, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, to plan an operation for
War Zone C in northern Tay Ninh Province to start soon after the Christmas and
New Year stand downs of 1966- 67. (Map 5) He further indicated that it should be
a 'big operation.' Over the next several months the operation, to be known as
JUNCTION CITY, was planned. As approved by General Westmoreland, the operation
was to start on 8 January 1967, was to be multidivisional, and was to include a
parachute assault. The operation to commence on 8 January would not be JUNTION
CITY: the preemptor was to be known as CEDAR FALLS.
As II Field Force troop strength built
up in 1966 and it became more capable of attacking the enemy in longtime havens,
General Seaman's headquarters was considering the possibility of a powerful
strike into the Iron Triangle. The Iron Triangle is generally defined on the
southwest by the Saigon River, on the east by the Thi Tinh River, and on the
north by a line running west from Ben Cat to the town of Ben Suc on the Saigon
River. To the north lies the Thanh Dien Forestry Reserve. The Iron Triangle has
been characterized as a dagger pointed at Saigon and, being only twenty
kilometers away, was the enemy's largest haven close to that city. The area was
heavily fortified and known to contain the Viet Cong headquarters for Military
Region IV which directed military, political, and terrorist activities in the
Saigon-Gia Dinh capital region complex. Viet Cong control of the Iron Triangle
permitted the enemy forces to dominate key transportation routes in the
surrounding area. This important center for controlling and supporting enemy
operations had to be attacked decisively and in force if the attack were to
succeed in rupturing and neutralizing the control structure.
At a planning meeting in September 1966
General Seaman discussed the possibility of an operation in the triangle with
General Westmoreland, who suggested a coordinated operation with forces
