The war in Vietnam is as highly complex as any in our country's history. It is a war with no front, no rear. There is often no easily identifiable enemy. The Communists deny that there are any North Vietnamese in the south. Those from the south live among the very persons they threaten. At the same time we engage multi-battalion forces we also fight against individual guerrilla bands numbering but a few men. (Map 1)

We have been facing a Communist aggressor whose avowed objective is to gain control of the government, the land, and the peoples of South Vietnam. We have agreed to support the South Vietnamese against the enemy in order to buy time for the south, time in which the people can prepare to defend themselves and to shape their own destiny.

We are engaged in a conflict in which we are allied with forces whose approach to life is different from ours and whose history goes back centuries before ours. Using sophisticated weapons in the hands of tough, well-trained American soldiers, we, along with our allies, have been fighting a dedicated and disciplined enemy in South Vietnam who employs no air power, little naval effort, and comparatively few mechanized vehicles. Yet he has forced us, the most powerful nation in the world, to fight the longest war in our history.

This monograph concerns two operations conducted in early 1967 which marked a turning point in this conflict from the view-point of the tide of battle and tactical doctrine. The conditions which led to this turning point had been developing over the years from the time of the withdrawal of the French from Indochina in 1954 until Operation ATTLEBORO in late 1966.

At the outset of this twelve-year period the United States endorsed the new Geneva Accords and offered, through President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means' in the hope 'that such aid, combined with . . . continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government.' From this commitment stems our involvement in South Vietnam.

Following this commitment by our Commander in Chief in