The United States Army has met an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own choosing, free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia has required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units.

As this assignment nears an end, the U.S. Army must prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements.

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared a series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at the same time contributing to the historical record and providing the American public with an interim report on the performance of men and officers who have responded, as others have throughout our history, to exacting and trying demands.

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were taking place in the present.

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official records, with additional material from published and unpublished secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography have been omitted from the published version; a fully documented account with bibliography is filed with the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers is especially well qualified to write Cedar Falls-Junction City because of a broad and varied military career. His military experience includes action in Korea and Vietnam as well as assignments in Germany. In Korea he served in the 2d Infantry Division as commander of the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, and later joined the staff of the Commander in Chief, United Nations and Far East Commands, in Tokyo, Japan. While assigned to the 24th Infantry Division in Augsburg, Germany, he served as commander of the 1st Battle Group, 19th Infantry, and for fourteen months as chief of staff of the division. In Vietnam he served as assistant division commander of the 1st Infantry Division, where he participated in Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY.

General Rogers attended Oxford University, England, from 1947 to 1950 as a Rhodes Scholar, receiving the B.A. and M.A. degrees in philosophy, politics, and economics. Later from September 1967 to June 1969 he served as commandant of cadets at the United States Military Academy. He was Chief of Legislative Liaison on the staff of the Secretary of the Army from January 1971 until November 1972. He is currently Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army.

VERNE L. BOWERS

The Adjutant General Major General, USA

15 June 1973 Washington, D.C.

Preface

Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point has been written at the request of General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, who, concerned about the lack of authoritative accounts of various actions and activities in Vietnam, desired that a series of monographs be prepared to fill the void in the Army's historical library.

Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY took place during the first five months of 1967 and were the first multidivisional operations in Vietnam to be conducted according to a preconceived plan. They were to result in a turning point in the war: they confirmed that such operations do have a place in counterinsurgency warfare today; they brought an end to the enemy's thinking that his third phase of the war- large-scale operations throughout the country -would be successful; they caused the enemy to re-evaluate his tactics and revert to smaller-scale guerrilla operations; they destroyed his camps, pillaged his supplies, and killed hundreds of his best troops; they proved to the enemy that his old sanctuaries were no longer inviolable, thus causing him to depend primarily upon those located over the border in Cambodia; they helped convince the enemy that the maintenance of large bases and main force units near urban areas was risky business; and they enhanced immeasurably the confidence of the allied forces in South Vietnam, a confidence which had been growing since the dark days of the first half of 1965. Thus CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY were to become the most important operations of the war to that time, and perhaps since.

For the military history buff, Operation CEDAR FALLS will not be nearly so interesting as JUNCTION CITY because it consisted primarily of small unit contacts and the onerous tasks of finding and destroying base camps, storage facilities, and tunnels and of clearing jungles. CEDAR FALLS was unique, however, in that one of its missions was to evacuate some 6,000 inhabitants of the Iron Triangle area and destroy their villages. JUNCTION CITY, on the other hand, was more varied in view of its scope and the fact that there were five battles interspersed among the air assaults and the numerous search and destroy activities.

As an assistant division commander of the 1st Infantry Division from November 1966 to August 1967, I had the opportunity first-hand to observe and participate in the planning and execution of the two operations. From a personal standpoint, it was an extremely rewarding experience to serve with the Big Red One during the period when its commanding general for CEDAR FALLS was Major General William E. DePuy and for JUNCTION CITY was Major General John H. Hay, Jr. Their intricate planning, rapid and decisive execution of actions, and employment of new concepts, coupled with the bravery and skill of our troops, made these two operations the success they were.

I have expanded this monograph somewhat by including an introduction which covers those major events from the time of our initial commitment in Vietnam to Operation ATTLEBORO in November 1966, events which led to and influenced CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY. The hope is that the introduction will assist the reader in putting these two operations in perspective.

In assembling the data for this monograph, I have drawn primarily from after action reports and interviews, documented lessons learned, newspaper and magazine articles, personal letters, written and tape-recorded material, and my recollection of events. For the historical information contained in the introduction, I have relied exclusively upon the excellent document, Report on the War in Vietnam, by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp and General William C. Westmoreland.

I would like to thank the members of the Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, who have assisted in the compilation of the material for this monograph. I would particularly like to express my appreciation to Lieutenant Colonel John R. Vilas for researching and organizing this document. The final product is mine, and for it I assume full responsibility.

BERNARD W. ROGERS

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army