CHAPTER 12
Logistics and Construction
The Logistic
Situation-Ill MAF Naval Responsibilities-RED BALL and CRITIPAC-The Force
Logistic Support Group-Engineering and Construction
The Logistic
Situation
When the decision was made in early
1965 to commit major U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam, MACV was prepared to
support only the 20,000 U.S. troops already there. General Westmoreland,
therefore, requested the commitment of Marines to the I Corps area since the
Marine units were the only readily available forces prepared to support
themselves over the beaches in an area of few ports and airfields.' According to
one source:
The Marine Corps equipment posture was
at its highest peacetime level of readiness since the Korean War. Modern
equipment and ammunition with adequate backup stocks were available to equip and
support units required for mobilization, and to improve the combat capability of
the Fleet Marine Forces.2
This report overstated the case of
Marine logistic preparedness. Logistics for the Marines in Vietnam soon became a
major problem, despite the fact that for the first time a combat force had been
deployed with a computerized supply system. The computerization broke down '
'right off the bat... when the stock cards began swelling due to the high
humidity and the cards wouldn't fit in the machine.' Record keeping had to be
accomplished manually for an extended period, slowing down the entire
operation.'
A malfunctioning requisition system
compounded supply difficulties. In contrast to the practice in World War II and
Korea, the Marine Corps in Vietnam used a 'pull' system of resupply rather than
forced feeding. Units made requisitions based on predicted usage, but the
predictions, even with the incorporation of a 'Combat Active Factor,'
underestimated the unique demands of the Vietnam situation. Colonel Mauro J.
Padalino, the in MAF Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) commander, later
explained:
Those calculations never envisioned
either the harsh environment (degraded roads, Chu Lai, etc.) nor the garrison,
war-time 24-hour around-the-clock type operations the Corps experienced. In a
free-type battlefield situation where there is constant forward movement with
minimal pauses for consolidation, there is less wear and tear on equipment and
supplies by comparison, to the in-place situation.4
Padalino pointed out that the dirt
roads were initially trafficable, but in time ' 'they were reduced to deep
powder or mud' resulting in an ' 'astronomical rise in demand for repair
parts.'' The FLSG commander concluded 'the garrison environment imposed a much
broader base of demand on the supply system-requisitions for salt and pepper
shakers competed with requisitions for combat essentials.'5
Many commodities such as fork lifts,
barbed wire, and field fortifications were in short supply. One of the most
acute shortages was radio batteries, which, since there was no refrigeration,
'instead of lasting 25 hours . . . pooped out in four hours.' '6 For a short
period in May, ni MAF found it necessary to limit patrol activity because of the
lack of batteries for PRC-10 radios. The logistic situation saw some improvement
on 5 June, when the Defense Department finally permitted General Greene to
release emergency FMFPac mount-out supplies for shipment to Vietnam.
The impact of the release of the
mount-out supplies was still modest. One Marine commander later remarked that
this action ' 'was akin [to applying].. . a bandaid to a massive wound.'7 By the
end of June, the Marine Corps pipeline, designed to support a peacetime
consumption rate, was beginning to show the strain. Colonel Nickerson, the in
MAF G-4 at the time, commented: '... there was no magic solution for the deluge
of problems except hard, intelligent work-the use of imagination, ingenuity, and
common sense was ever important. '8 Nickerson would assign a particular problem
to a member of his
